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ABSTRACT: This paper first examines the constitutional provisions that must guide public research 
assessment procedures. Freedom of research (Art. 20(1)(b) CE) requires these procedures to be 
“suitable” for science as well as for science to be involved therein. After presenting the concepts 
and notions used in the international debate on research assessment (bibliometrics, quantitative or 
qualitative research, peer review, etc.), there is an outline of the various types of research assessment 
procedures in place under Spanish law according to the subject of assessment (research works, 
researchers’ CVs, research projects and institutional assessments). The paper then looks into the 
characteristics of law that are relevant from the perspective of legal research assessment. The closing 
remarks include a set of proposals revolving around the idea that public authorities must create 
organizational structures and procedures allowing every scientific community to set the criteria to 
be applied to research assessment within each scholarly field.
KEYWORDS: research assessment; universities; higher education; freedom of research; sexenio; accred-
itation; research projects; law; legal science; legal research.
RESUMEN: En este trabajo se analizan, en primer término, las directivas constitucionales que deben 
informar los procedimientos estatales de evaluación de la investigación. La libertad de investi-
gación científica [art. 20.1 b) CE] exige que esos procedimientos sean “adecuados” a la ciencia 
y que en ellos participe la ciencia misma. Tras la presentación de los conceptos utilizados en el 
debate internacional sobre la evaluación de la investigación (bibliometría, criterios cuantitativos o 
cualitativos, peer review, etc.), se exponen los diversos tipos de procedimientos de evaluación de la 
investigación existentes en el Derecho español en función del objeto evaluado (trabajos de inves-
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tigación, currículum de investigadores, proyectos de investigación y evaluación institucional). Se 
tratan, a continuación, las características propias de la ciencia del Derecho que son relevantes desde 
la perspectiva de la evaluación de la investigación jurídica. Y se concluye con algunas propuestas 
que giran en torno a la idea de que sobre el Estado pesa la responsabilidad de crear organizaciones 
y procedimientos que sirvan a cada una de las comunidades científicas para fijar los criterios que 
serán aplicados en la evaluación de la investigación que se realiza en cada una de esas disciplinas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: evaluación de la investigación; Universidades; libertad de investigación científica; 
sexenios; acreditaciones; proyectos de investigación; ciencia jurídica.
SUMMARY: 1. OPENING REMARKS: WHY IS THERE A PUBLIC ASSESSMENT OF RE-
SEARCH? —2. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AFFECTING THE PUBLIC ASSESS-
MENT OF RESEARCH: 2.1. The objective dimension of freedom of research (Art. 20(1)(b) 
CE): evaluations suitable for science, evaluations involving research or science itself and evaluations 
assessed based on their effects on research. 2.2. The reserva de ley principle or statutory reservation 
(Art. 53(1) in connection with Art. 20(1)(b) of the Spanish Constitution): the core aspects of 
research assessment must be regulated by an act of Parliament or statute. 2.3. The fundamental 
right to personal data protection (Art. 18(4) CE).—3. RESEARCH ASSESSMENT: SUBJECT, 
CRITERIA, INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES: 3.1. The “evaluators’ jargon” 3.2. Quanti-
tative and qualitative criteria. 3.3. Research assessment tools: bibliometric indicators and peer re-
view. 3.4. The assessment procedure.—4. TYPES OF RESEARCH ASSESSMENT IN SPANISH 
LAW: 4.1. Direct assessment of research works. 4.2. Research project assessment. 4.3. Assessment 
of researchers. 4.4. Institutional assessment of research.—5. CHARACTERISTICS OF LAW 
DEEMED SIGNIFICANT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF RESEARCH ASSESSMENT: 
5.1. Legal science hinges on hermeneutics and mostly deals with legislative texts. 5.2. Ties between 
legal science and the practice of law. 5.3. The subject of legal science is segmented because it hinges 
on domestic legal orders. 5.4. Legal research is tied to the language of legal provisions. 5.5. Publi-
cation formats for research works. 5.6. Law is a discipline “of mostly individual authorship”.—6. 
QUALITY CRITERIA IN LEGAL RESEARCH ASSESSMENT.—7. CONCLUSIONS AND 
PROPOSALS.—8. REFERENCES
1.  OPENING REMARKS: WHY IS THERE  
A PUBLIC ASSESSMENT OF RESEARCH?
The 1998 Sorbonne Declaration and the Bologna Declaration of 1999 triggered 
a convergence process towards the European Higher Education Area (EHEA). This 
path towards convergence gave rise to the notion of “quality assurance” 1 within 
1 Regarding Spain, see Art. 35 (quality assurance) of Constitutional (Organic) Act 6/2001, of De-
cember 21, on Universities (Ley Orgánica 6/2001, de 21 de diciembre, de Universidades, LOU). Other 
abbreviations used in this paper: AEI - Agencia Estatal de Investigación (National Research Agency); 
ANECA - Agencia Nacional de Evaluación de la Calidad y Acreditación (National Quality Assurance 
and Accreditation Agency); CE - Constitución Española (Spanish Constitution); CNEAI - Comisión 
Nacional Evaluadora de la Actividad Investigadora (National Commission for the Evaluation of Re-
search Activity); SCI - Science Citation Index; SSCI - Social Sciences Citation Index; LPAC - Ley 
39/2015, de 1 de octubre, de Procedimiento Administrativo Común de las Administraciones Públicas 
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Member States’ higher education law, which is almost inextricably linked to assess-
ments and evaluation procedures. Assessment, alongside quality assurance, is aimed 
at achieving two core objectives pursued by the EHEA: i) enhancing competitiveness 
and ii) promoting the internationalization of the European higher education system.
Teaching and research assessment methods and procedures lagged behind the 
EHEA project (i.e., they were prior in time and actually lagging behind at the level of 
ideas) and they were closely related to New Public Management stances, aimed at de-
taching public authorities from decision-making and control of productive activity, 
whilst focusing on output 2 and on performance-oriented approaches. When applied 
to higher education, these approaches brought along teaching performance assess-
ment and research evaluation methods. As elected public officials lost decision-mak-
ing powers (i.e., there was a lesser substantive input from democratically elected 
public authorities), accountability vis-à-vis parliaments and society as a whole took 
over, particularly regarding the allocation of financial resources. Accountability, effi-
ciency and transparency in the allocation of scarce public resources became guiding 
principles governing academic activity through assessments and evaluation proce-
dures 3. Furthermore, academic assessments proved effective in legitimizing political 
decision-making. In order to allow for sound public policy-making in the field of 
academic research (and thus for widely-accepted public policies), the results and 
information obtained from academic evaluation procedures have to be disclosed, 
thereby bringing academic performance into the open 4.
The aforesaid approaches and lines of reasoning provided research assessment ad-
vocates with the terminology for their claims: institutional autonomy (which allows 
to solely account for results), competition and competitiveness, performance-based 
resource allocation, efficiency and transparency, etc. Those against these approaches 
have also come up with their own response to what they call “evaluitis” 5. Over time, 
scientific research has moved forward on the basis of researchers’ intrinsic motivation 
or inner drive, self-determination and independence 6; research assessment replaces 
(Act on the Standard Administrative Procedure for Public Authorities); LRJSP - Ley 40/2015, de 1 
de octubre, de Régimen Jurídico del Sector Público (Act on the Legal Regime applicable to Public 
Authorities).
2 See, in a nutshell, Gunnar Folke SCHUPPERT, Verwaltungswissenschaft. Verwaltung, Verwal-
tungsrecht, Verwaltungslehre, Baden-Baden, 2000, pp. 999 et seq.; Jacques CHEVALLIER, El Estado 
postmoderno (translation into Spanish from the French original of 2008), Bogota, 2011, pp. 124 et seq.
3 In this connection, see Margarit SECKELMANN, Evaluation und Recht, Tübingen, 2018, pp. 
12-13, 339.
4 SECKELMANN, 2018: 49-60.
5 See the title of Bruno S. FREY’s work, “Evaluitis – Eine neue Krankheit”, Center for Research 
in Economics, Management and the Arts, working paper no. 18, 2006, available at: http://www.crema-
research.ch/papers/2006-18.pdf
6 See Mercè DARNACULLETA, “Libertad de investigación científica y promoción de la ciencia 
en beneficio del interés general”, in Fernando LÓPEZ RAMÓN, Ricardo RIVERO ORTEGA and 
Marcos M. FERNANDO PABLO (coord.), Organización de la Universidad y la ciencia, Madrid, 2018, 
pp. 232 et seq. This work rejects the “utilitarian approach to research” underlying research evaluation 
procedures and the modern notion of researcher (in contrast with a more scholarly or scientific notion). 
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society’s reliance on scholars with such degree of control that undermines creativity 
and creates perverse incentives, including those that privilege quantity over quality 
in academic production. Also, performance evaluation in academia fails to appropri-
ately reflect academic output and hinders research through red tape and burdensome 
and recurring requirements 7.
The aforesaid criticism also focuses on the perverse incentives that research assess-
ment may have on the other cornerstone of university activity: teaching. Privileging 
research (which gives domestic and international prestige or recognition) may under-
rate teaching (which always has more of a local scope), thereby leading to a decrease 
in teaching quality. This is not inconceivable if, for instance, a given university re-
wards its so-considered best researchers with a reduced teaching load 8. Recent stud-
ies have shown i) that the quantity of research has no impact on teaching whatsoever, 
neither positive nor negative, whereas ii) the quality of research is apparently related 
to the quality of teaching, simply because top scholars tend to perform remarkably 
in any academic activity 9.
This paper does not address teaching evaluation (involving, for instance, the as-
sessment or review of university curricula), which poses specific issues and has its 
own rationale aside from that of research assessment; if only that academic freedom 
in universities must be weighed against students’ right to quality education, edu-
cation not only being a fundamental right, but also a duty imposed on public au-
thorities 10. Teaching evaluation and research assessment are thus rooted on different 
theoretical premises.
This paper does not discuss whether or not academic research should be assessed. 
Rather, it examines the best possible way to evaluate performance in academia and, 
in particular, the best approach to assessing the quality of legal research. Neverthe-
less, I do wish that more heavily state-funded activities than research were subject to 
such a close scrutiny!
Academic utilitarianism “substantially limits the freedom of research to be (allegedly) encouraged the-
reby”.
7 Along these lines, see WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, Empfehlungen zur Bewertung und Steuerung von 
Forschungsleistung, 2011, pp. 2-9. The reports and publications of these advisory body for the German 
Bund and Länder regarding public policy on academic research are available at: https://www.wissens-
chaftsrat.de
8 On these potentially perverse incentives, see WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2011: 31.
9 Referring to a study carried out in the University of Maribor (Slovenia); Simon CADEZ, Vlado 
DIMOVSKI and Maja ZAMAN GROFF, “Research, teaching and performance evaluation in acade-
mia: the salience of quality”, Studies in Higher Education, 42:8, 2017, pp. 1455-1473.
10 However, broadly speaking (in line with Art. 1(1) LOU), the public service provided by univer-
sities includes research and study along with teaching. On this matter, see Íñigo SANZ RUBIALES, “La 
Universidad: entre el servicio público y la competencia”, in Fernando LÓPEZ RAMÓN, RICARDO 
RIVERO ORTEGA and Marcos M. FERNANDO PABLO (coord.), Organización de la Universidad y 
la ciencia, Madrid, 2018, pp. 49 et seq., in particular, pp. 62-63.
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2.  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AFFECTING  
THE PUBLIC ASSESSMENT OF RESEARCH
Research assessment by public authorities is subject to a set of constitutional 
requirements, mainly stemming from: a) freedom of research (Art. 20(1)(b) of the 
Spanish Constitution –Constitución Española or CE–); b) the Gesetzesvorbehalt or 
reserva de ley principle 11, under which the core aspects of research assessment must 
be governed by an Act of Parliament or statute: Art. 53(1) in connection with Art. 
20(1)(b) CE; and c) the fundamental right to personal data protection (Art. 18(4) 
CE) which may be affected by the information flows within research assessment 
procedures.
2.1.  The objective dimension of freedom of research  
(Art. 20(1)(b) CE): evaluations suitable for science,  
evaluations involving research or science itself  
and evaluations assessed based on their effects on research
The legal consequences (regarding the granting of academic degrees, access to 
funding or career advancement of researchers) tied by the applicable provisions to 
the results of public research assessments clearly direct or steer academic research. 
Any professor who does not wish to be left out of the Spanish academic system is 
fully aware that every six years, he/she must submit 5 of his/her scholarly works for 
assessment by the National Commission for the Evaluation of Research Activity (Co-
misión Nacional Evaluadora de la Actividad Investigadora or CNEAI). This National 
Commission’s criteria will necessarily affect the professional activity of each of the 
“field” 12 members within the “social sub-system” 13 of scientific research. The soft 
law standards applied by the National Quality Assurance and Accreditation Agency 
(Agencia Nacional de Evaluación de la Calidad y Acreditación or ANECA) to the 
applications for accreditation have a decisive impact on the research decisions to be 
made by a professor on tenure track who wants to become a Full Professor. Universi-
ty research groups tend to focus on topics listed under programs funded by the Na-
tional Research Agency (Agencia Estatal de Investigación or AEI), who is responsible 
11 “Reserva de ley” has often been translated as “statutory reservation”, “statutory requirement”, 
“requirement for a statute” or “to be defined by an Act of Parliament”. This notion refers to a principle 
under which a matter must be regulated by a statutory provision or an Act of Parliament. See http://
legalspaintrans.com/legal-translation/how-to-translate-reserva-de-ley-into-english-using-a-descriptive-
strategy/ or http://transblawg.eu/2014/12/18/gesetzesvorbehalt/ for further details.
12 As for applying for sexenios, the scientific community is divided into 11 fields. Concerning the 
most recent call, see the Resolution issued by CNEAI on November 14, 2018 disclosing the specific 
criteria approved for each of the fields of assessment. Available at: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.
php?id=BOE-A-2018-16138
13 Niklas LUHMANN, Grundrechte als Institution, Berlin, 1965, pp. 23 and 186 et seq., should be 
credited for this expression.
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for the prior and ex post assessment of research projects submitted by the said groups. 
Tying university funding to research results or performance is also an incentive that 
affects researchers.
In my view, the subjective dimension of the fundamental right to scientific re-
search, aimed at safeguarding creativity (i.e., the independent quest for scientific 
findings) as well as the reporting of results by researchers (i.e., placing and contextu-
alizing findings within the ongoing discourse that encourages scientific progress) 14, 
is not the best approach to research assessment analysis 15; particularly considering 
that the most significant evaluation procedures are –at least formally– optional or 
voluntary. Research assessment criteria applied by public authorities will be hardly 
noticeable (in terms of direction or driving force) within the sphere of creativity 
and self-determination of those scholars who fail to apply for sexenios (i.e., six-year 
research assessments that can lead to an acknowledgment of research performance 
and a small salary increase), who refuse to pursue the tenure track by applying for 
ANECA accreditations, or who do not request funding for research projects. How-
ever, these scholars might not be able to bypass the driving force or guiding effect 
of the criteria applied by (often) private publishers and owners of journals where 
researchers wish to publish their works following a peer review.
Most research assessment procedures are not explained only by the public au-
thorities’ commitment to the citizens’ sphere of self-determination and freedom (the 
subjective dimension of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 20(1)(b) of 
the Spanish Constitution, CE), but also by the duty, undertaken by public author-
ities, to promote knowledge and scientific research (Art. 44(2) CE). Indeed, public 
authorities have “institutionalized” scholarly output or scientific creations through 
public entities, procedures and funding 16. From the objective dimension of freedom 
of research, it can be inferred that these instruments of public power (organization, 
procedure and funding), with a driving force or guiding effect, must be regulated so 
as to prevent public interference with “inherently scientific or scholarly activities”. 
Moreover, the aforesaid objective dimension also prevents public advancement of 
research from undermining science itself.
The foregoing has the following implications: i) research assessment should not 
interfere with the development of scientific knowledge subject to science’s own rule-
14 According to SECKELMANN, 2018: 226-227, creativity and reportability are the two defining 
features of scientific research. Regarding the notion of “creativity”, Antonio Eduardo EMBID TELLO, 
La libertad de investigación científica. Una interpretación integrada de sus dimensiones subjetiva y objetiva, 
Valencia, 2017, pp. 173 et seq. suggests to “merge” the subjective and objective dimensions of freedom 
of research.
15 Nevertheless, SECKELMANN, 2018: 425-429, for instance, looks at research assessment pro-
cedures as an interference with the fundamental right to scientific production on the basis of the pro-
portionality principle (suitability or adequacy, necessity and weighing or proportionality stricto sensu).
16 The approach follows-up on that used in José María RODRÍGUEZ DE SANTIAGO, “Liber-
tad de investigación científica y sexenios”, Revista catalana de dret públic, no. 44, 2012, pp. 225-252, 
particularly, pp. 227-235.
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book 17, i.e., research evaluation must be “suitable” for science; ii) scientific research 
itself should be involved in the prior design of assessment procedures and in the very 
performance of evaluations, and iii) public authorities are required (a) to monitor 
or follow-up (on an ex post basis) on the impact of research evaluations on scientific 
research and, where appropriate, (b) to remedy any possible flaws.
On the “suitability” of research assessment, it is worth noting that evaluation pro-
cedures are not inherently alien to science. For centuries, PhDs have been awarded 
following a peer review process of an original research work. Also, peer reviews of 
contributions submitted to journals or publishers arose from the social sub-system of 
scientific research with no public intervention whatsoever. Nonetheless, the suitabili-
ty standard prevents public evaluations from creating perverse incentives for scientif-
ic advancement 18, as is the case with assessment criteria that privilege quantity over 
quality –the first being easier to evaluate– thereby encouraging “salami slicing” (i.e., 
dividing one significant piece of research into a number of smaller “slices” simply to 
increase the number of publications) 19 or the “Matthew effect” (i.e., being rewarded 
under a given indicator, such as being granted research funding, will probably allow 
researchers to get more credit on the basis of that indicator and others in the future, 
for instance, helping them to receive performance-based public funding considering 
the previously obtained private resources) 20. Suitability to science could also trigger 
the constitutional requirement that different assessment criteria be applied to dif-
ferent fields or subjects 21. Allocating university funds to the various schools on the 
basis of the amount of funding obtained through external contracts or agreements 
(under Art. 83 LOU) would privilege certain fields of research disregarding research 
quality and solely focusing on the market value of research outputs. If applied as 
a single or prevailing standard, this assessment criterion is ill-adapted to science. 
Generally, granting more funds to applied science than to hermeneutics research (a 
trend noted by certain authors) is detrimental to science itself, and thus unsuitable 
or inappropriate 22.
17 In this vein, see Michael FEHLING, “Wissenschaftsfreiheit (Art. 5 Abs. 3 GG)”,  in Rudolf 
DOLZER and Klaus VOGEL (dir.), Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 1 et 
seq., specifically, pp. 40 and 62; Ute Mager, “Freiheit von Forschung und Lehre”, in Josef ISENSEE 
and Paul KIRCHHOF, Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. VII, Heidelberg, 
2009, pp. 1075 et seq., in particular, §12 and 25; and Hans-Heinrich Trute, Die Forschung zwischen 
grundrechtlicher Freiheit und staatlicher Institutionalisierung, Tübingen, 1994, pp. 80 et seq.
18 SECKELMANN, 2018: 432.
19 On this matter, see, for example, SECKELMANN, 2018: 378.
20 Described by Robert K. MERTON in 1968 and named after the Gospel of Matthew, Chapter 
25, verse 29: “For to every one who has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but from him who 
has not, even what he has will be taken away”.
21 This has been expressly stated by the German Federal Constitutional Court (first senate) in its 
Judgments of October 26, 2004 (regarding the Brandenburg Regional Act on Universities), par. 171; 
and of February 17, 2016 (regarding the review of curricula), par. 60. On this topic, see SECKEL-
MANN, 2018: 384; she graphically claims that one size does not fit all.
22 In this connection, see EMBID TELLO, 2017: 239.
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In this context, some criticism has been recently drawn by what has been called 
a “projectization” of science. “Plain old research” has been superseded by research 
projects 23. Science as a whole takes the form of a project, and projects give rise to a 
temporary structure (with a set of objectives, stages, expected findings and a budget) 
perfectly suited for evaluation. This results in a relationship based on reciprocity: 
assessments lead to the “projectization of science” and projects call for research assess-
ment 24. Obviously, the losers in this context are those fields “of mostly individual au-
thorship” (including law) 25, where the creative process basically entails a long-lasting 
“polarized thinking or chronical focus” by the researcher on his/her subject matter; 
and where the relevant findings lead the scholar to ask him or herself the following 
question: “How could I not come up with this earlier”? 26 It is because ideas, which 
cannot be scheduled in a research project application, “occur to us when they please, 
not when it pleases us” 27.
Furthermore, in order to prevent evaluation procedures from giving rise to driv-
ing or guiding effects alien to scientific rationality, the involvement of scientists them-
selves (researchers) is necessary in the prior design of these procedures and, particu-
larly, when laying down the assessment criteria. This is also the only way to ensure 
that the specificities inherent to every discipline are taken into account in the assess-
ment 28. The regulatory idea can be found in the 2011 Act on Science: the Advisory 
Body on Science, Technology and Innovation (Consejo Asesor de Ciencia, Tecnología 
e Innovación), in its capacity as a participatory body mostly engaging 29 the scientific 
or research community in science or research-related matters, is responsible for pro-
moting the design of “thorough assessment mechanisms 30”.
Similarly, pursuant to the objective dimension of freedom of research, scientists’ 
opinions and considerations on their peers’ research activity must be decisive in the 
very performance of assessments (subject to previously established procedures and cri-
23 See the work of Marc TORKA, Die Projektförmigkeit der Forschung, Baden-Baden, 2009, among 
others, p. 9.
24 SECKELMANN, 2018: 242 and 352.
25 In sum (regardless of further analysis provided herein), see Helmut SCHULZE-FIELITZ, “Was 
macht die Qualität öffentlich-rechtlicher Forschung aus?”, Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts der Gegen-
wart, no. 50, 2002, pp. 1-68, specifically, p. 12.
26 This is how Santiago RAMÓN Y CAJAL described intellectual work in Reglas y consejos sobre 
la investigación científica. Los tónicos de la voluntad, Madrid, 2008 (second printing of the 1920 sixth 
edition), particularly, pp. 49-52, 55, 66.
27 Max WEBER, La ciencia como profesión, Madrid (Espasa Calpe), 1992 (Spanish version of the 
conference delivered by the author in 1919), p. 62.
28 WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, Empfehlungen zur Bewertung und Steuerung von Forschungsleistung, 
2011, p. 35.
29 The Advisory Body on Science, Technology and Innovation (Consejo Asesor de Ciencia, Tecno-
logía e Innovación) is also a participatory body for economic and social stakeholders (Art. 9(1) of Act 
14/2011, of June 1, on Science, Technology and Innovation), but at least two thirds of the Advisory 
Body’s members should be “prominent members” of the scientific, technology or innovation commu-
nity (Art. 9(3) of Act 14/2011).
30 See Art. 9(2)(e) of Act 14/2011, of June 1, on Science, Technology and Innovation.
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teria governing applications for tenure or promotion, project funding or the granting 
of sexenios). Peer review is an essential instrument at the service of academic self-gov-
ernance 31 and, according to the foregoing, it is also a constitutional requirement 
for most evaluations (namely, for any assessment that cannot be performed through 
automatic indicators).
Instruments of public power with a driving force or guiding effects (organization, 
procedure and funding) used by public authorities to fulfil their duty of promoting 
research (Art. 44(2) CE) must be “well-suited” for science. This guarantee of suitabil-
ity requires public authorities to monitor –on an ex post basis and from this suitability 
perspective– any applicable research assessment procedures. The abovementioned 
guarantee of suitability also requires public authorities to remedy any unexpected 
flaws in the said assessment procedures. This (modern day) ex post monitoring by 
public authorities 32, “to verify compliance of the applicable rules and regulations 
with the set objectives” 33, is, within this context, a fundamental right requirement. 
Accordingly, public assessment of research must be periodically subject to evaluation, 
in order to examine all of the wanted and unwanted effects 34. The information stem-
ming from these “evaluation of research assessments” (meta-assessment) 35 must be 
taken into account by lawmakers, by the competent rulemaking bodies, and by the 
public authorities conducting the assessment procedures, so that every body (pun 
intended) can make the relevant adjustments within their scope of powers 36.
2.2.  The reserva de ley principle or statutory reservation (Art. 53(1)  
in connection with Art. 20(1)(b) of the Spanish Constitution):  
the core aspects of research assessment must be regulated by  
an act of Parliament or statute
The regulatory density of research assessment provisions is governed by a set of 
constitutional principles that can be somewhat conflicting. On the one hand, the re-
serva de ley principle or statutory reservation enshrined in the Constitution regarding 
fundamental rights (Art. 53(1) in connection with Art. 20(1)(b) CE), realizing the 
rule of law and the constitutional principle of democracy, requires lawmakers (the 
legislature) to make any relevant decisions (there is no need for further elaboration 
31 See, among others, Andreas LIENHARD, Thierry TANQUEREL, Alexandre FLÜCKIGER, 
Fabian AMSCHWAND, Kari BYLAND and Eva HERRMANN, Forschungsevaluation in der Re-
chtswissenschaft. Grundlagen und empirische Analyse in der Schweiz, Bern, 2016, p. 115; WISSENS-
CHAFTSRAT, Peer Review in Higher Education and Research. Position Paper, 2017, p. 9.
32 See, among others, Antonio Eduardo EMBID TELLO, “Calidad normativa y evaluación ex-post 
de las normas jurídicas”, Revista General de Derecho Administrativo, no. 50, 2019.
33 See Art. 130(1) of Act 39/2015, of October 1, on the standard administrative procedure for 
public authorities (LPAC).
34 WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2011: 34.
35 This terminology can be found in LIENHARD et al., 2016: 101-102.
36 Along these lines, SECKELMANN, 2018: 428.
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at this point) as for the implementation of the fundamental right to freedom of re-
search. On the other hand, as noted above, the provisions passed by political bodies 
with rulemaking powers (both parliaments and governments) cannot be as compre-
hensive as to leave no room for assessment criteria stemming from research or science 
itself 37. This is why, as a matter of principle, there is no problem (quite the opposite, 
in fact) for the specific substantive criteria applied in research evaluations to be laid 
down elsewhere other than in statutory or regulatory provisions 38.
From the perspective of the objective dimension of freedom of research, research-
ers from each field (by means of organizations or entities and procedures sufficiently 
regulated by a statute) must provide for the relevant assessment standards. Finally, 
the principle of separation of powers also plays a role in this regard. This principle 
should be construed as an efficiency requirement or directive for the fulfilment of 
public duties, i.e., public bodies should perform those tasks for which they are bet-
ter suited considering the resources at their disposal 39. Self evidently, administrative 
organizational structures and procedures are, from this viewpoint, the most appro-
priate instruments for scientists or researchers themselves to clearly and predictably 
(yet flexibly) lay down research assessment criteria. In my view, a soft law adminis-
trative provision (as those published on ANECA’s website) prepared by a panel of 
researchers within a public agency is “better suited” for science, due to its origins and 
ultimate purpose, than a statutory or regulatory provision.
In the abstract, it is somewhat unclear which matters are actually subject to the 
reserva de ley principle (i.e., reserved for a statute) under Art. 53(1) CE in connection 
with Art. 20(1)(b). Apparently, lawmakers –through statutory provisions– should at 
least define the subject of assessment (for instance, a researcher’s scholarly work or 
a given university’s research performance) and the legal consequences thereof (with 
regard to university funding, career advancement of researchers, etc.); lawmakers 
should also lay down the core rules on the composition and functioning of research 
assessment bodies along with any relevant procedural provisions 40.
For example, one could assume that the reserva de ley principle requirements are 
fulfilled regarding the national accreditation for tenure –let’s look at Art. 57 of the 
Constitutional (Organic) Act on Universities (LOU). In contrast with the density of 
that regulation sexenios which, as shown below, are cornerstones of the public duty to 
promote research, remain governed (at least regarding their core aspects) by regulato-
ry, i.e., non-statutory, provisions 41. Additionally, the Campus of International Excel-
lence Program assessments (Programa Campus de Excelencia Internacional), of great 
importance for Spanish universities, are subject to ministerial orders barely covered 
37 Within German law, see the two judgments cited above: Judgments of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (first senate) of October 26, 2004 (regarding the Brandenburg Regional Act on 
Universities), par. 171; and of February 17, 2016 (regarding the review of curricula), par. 60.
38 However, EMBID TELLO, 2017: 253, has an opposing view.
39 See, for instance, Harmut MAURER, Staatsrecht, Munich, 1999, p. 371.
40 Along these lines, see SECKELMANN, 2018: 398-404.
41 On this matter, see RODRÍGUEZ DE SANTIAGO, 2012: 235-239.
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or supported by substantive statutory provisions; thus, it could be argued that these 
assessments do not comply with the reserva de ley principle requirements either 42.
2.3.  The fundamental right to personal data protection (Art. 18(4) CE)
Over the last few years, a new fundamental rights perspective revolving around 
the fundamental right to the protection of personal data (Art. 18(4) CE) has made a 
strong entrance in the law of public assessment of research. This right has been high-
ly compromised by the large bulks of information requested within administrative 
procedures conducted for research assessment purposes. Researchers who have filed 
an electronic application for the so-called “sexenios de transferencia” or “knowledge 
transfer sexenios” (i.e., six-year assessments that can lead to an acknowledgment of 
successful transfer of knowledge) at the first call of 2018 (implemented “on an ex-
perimental basis”) 43 have already experienced the impact on the electronic summary 
of the said application of the General Data Protection Regulation 44 and of Consti-
tutional (Organic) Act 3/2018, of December 5, on Personal Data Protection and the 
Guarantee of Digital Rights. According to the requirements of the newly enacted 
provisions, the said electronic summary reports the identity of the controller, the 
purposes of data processing, the recipients of personal data, the rights of data sub-
jects, etc.
This paper will not further examine the many issues posed by the fundamental 
right to data protection in the context of research assessment 45. However, given this 
evaluitis of the Spanish and European higher education system (although, as noted 
above, there are some admissible purposes for research assessment) the “data minimi-
zation” principle 46 could, generally speaking, streamline research assessment proce-
dures. The regulatory design of evaluations should smoothly coordinate them so that 
42 Art. 62 of Act 2/2011, of March 4, on Sustainable Economy, provides for the projects that will 
have priority within the program, but the procedure and organization regarding project assessment will 
be subject to Ministerial Order EDU/1539/2011, of June 2, including the call for funding applications 
for 2011 regarding the excellence sub-program of the Campus of International Excellence Program and 
implementing the procedure to grant the Campus of International Excellence award and to enter into 
agreements with Autonomous Regions (Regional Governments) within the scope of Ministerial Order 
EDU/903/2010, of April 8.
43 See i) Resolution issued by the National Commission for the Evaluation of Research Activity 
(Comisión Nacional Evaluadora de la Actividad Investigadora or CNEAI) on November 14, 2018 disclo-
sing the specific criteria approved for each of the fields of assessment, and ii) Resolution issued by the 
State Secretariat for Universities, Research, Development and Innovation providing for the procedure 
and time periods to apply for research assessment by CNEAI.
44 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 27 April 2016, 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free mo-
vement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
45 On this topic, see SECKELMANN, 2018: 421-424.
46 Art. 5(1)(c) of the General Data Protection Regulation.
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the results of a given assessment are useful for other assessments, thereby eliminating 
the burden for researchers of filling out forms with already submitted information.
By way of example, it is worth mentioning some of the regulatory ideas guiding 
the “Funding scheme for public universities in the Region of Madrid for 2006-
2010” 47. Part of the funding allocated to incentivize research performance results 
from the ratio between the number of sexenios granted to each university’s faculty 
and the number of sexenios that could have possibly been granted 48. The “Multi-an-
nual funding scheme of the Valencia Regional University System for 2010-2017” 49 
applies a similar mechanism regarding research performance-based funding 50. Con-
sidering that sexenios result from an ever-improving qualitative assessment, I think it 
is certainly right to use this research performance indicator for this purpose. It also 
prevents from re-submitting information for an additional assessment which would 
otherwise have to be conducted for the granting of performance-based funding to 
universities.
The data minimization principle suggests to use little (yet meaningful) research 
quality indicators in any research evaluation where those indicators may be signifi-
cant and allow not to add information 51.
3.  RESEARCH ASSESSMENT: SUBJECT, CRITERIA,  
INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES
Properly, assessment can be defined as an actual scientific practice entailing a 
systematic and transparent evaluation of an item or subject of assessment 52, and 
particularly a research-related subject if we are dealing with research assessment. 
Generally, the results of the assessment encourage those under evaluation to initiate 
learning and improvement processes, following, where appropriate, a meaningful 
debate and analysis involving stakeholders and parties concerned; especially if the 
assessed activity is that of an institution, such as a university as a whole. On top of 
that, assessments allow parties to be held accountable for a given activity (to who-
ever provides the funding, for instance), and they play a major legitimizing role for 
decision-making (e.g., regarding funding decisions), thereby rendering the decisions 
acceptable for the addressees 53. This legitimizing effect is mostly achieved if the crite-




48 See pp. 16 and 23 of the document cited in the previous footnote.
49 Plan plurianual de financiación del sistema universitario público valenciano 2010-2017. Available at: 
https://gerencia.ua.es/es/documentos/documentos433/plan-plurianual-de-financiacion-2010-2017.pdf
50 See pp. 9 and 28 of the document cited in the previous footnote.
51 In this vein, see WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2011: 39.
52 In this connection see LIENHARD et al., 2016: 64; see also, SECKELMANN, 2018: 159.
53 On this matter, see SECKELMANN, 2018: 59-60.
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ria driving the results of the assessment, and the application thereof, are sufficiently 
transparent.
3.1. The “evaluators’ jargon”
For several years now, the theory and practice of research evaluation (and, most 
notably, teaching performance assessment) has given rise to a true “evaluators’ jar-
gon” only for the initiated. This slang, or, better said, its shrillness (which is often 
borderline pompous or simply hilarious) is partly responsible for the alienation that 
many researchers feel about this new approach to performance evaluation in academ-
ia. In the 2019 call for Docentia (a so far voluntary teaching performance assessment 
tool) in Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, there was a glossary including terms 
such as “functional learning” (“aprendizaje funcional”), “gamification or game-based 
learning” (“gamificación or ludificación”) and “flipped classroom” (“aula invertida”). 
Faculty members whose teaching performance was subject to assessment were asked 
to report how the “student-teacher feedback worked”, and they were also requested 
to “produce any relevant evidence in case of qualitative feedback”.
Nevertheless, debate and analysis on any topic obviously require a distinct and 
nuanced terminology allowing to identify, with sufficient level of detail, the various 
aspects of the matter at stake. Below, I will try to examine this terminology in a pur-
posefully plain language.
Research assessments can be conducted by public bodies (on which we focus) or 
private persons or entities (such as the evaluation performed by an academic journal 
of a manuscript submitted for publication). They can also be performed prior to the 
actual research output (such as project assessments for funding decisions), during the 
research activity (to see progress) or on an ex post basis (to evaluate a research project’s 
degree of fulfilment of the relevant objectives). Additionally, research assessments 
can be classified as internal (self-evaluations conducted by certain universities, being 
the first stage of a more complex assessment procedure) or external (accreditation 
procedures for a professor on tenure track handled by ANECA where the researcher’s 
production is assessed). From the viewpoint of the subject of evaluation, assessments 
can be broken down into: i) direct assessment of research works (a doctoral disser-
tation or the five research contributions submitted for the sexenio application); ii) 
evaluation of research projects (which do not amount to actual research, but rather 
to work plans for research activity); iii) assessment of researchers (for accreditation 
or promotion purposes), and iv) institutional assessment (where the research activity 
of a university school or a university as a whole is subject to evaluation) 54. The latter 
classification will serve as an outline for the next section.
Assessments can have positive consequences, such as giving rise to the aforesaid 
debates and improvement processes. They can also have negative effects (to be mon-
54 These rankings can be found, for instance, in LIENHARD et al., 2016: 12-15, 66-72.
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itored, found and remedied by public authorities), such as indirectly encouraging 
research malpractice due to the pressure and competition triggered by research as-
sessment procedures 55; or underrating teaching if academic standing is made entirely 
dependent on the results of research assessments 56. However, we will now discuss the 
legal consequences that the rules governing research assessments tie to the outcome of 
these procedures. As stated above, the reserva de ley principle of Art. 53(1) in con-
nection with Art. 20(1)(b) CE requires lawmakers (through a statutory provision) to 
decide on this core aspect of research assessment. The legal consequences tied by the 
rule to the positive or negative result of an assessment are the following: being award-
ed a PhD or a promotion (accreditations); achieving tenure; being granted funding 
for research projects or increased financing based on performance for universities or 
university schools 57; obtaining productivity bonuses (salary increases attached to the 
granting of sexenios) or other incentives such as a reduced teaching load (Art. 68(2) 
LOU), etc.
3.2. Quantitative and qualitative criteria
In my view, the most significant aspect of research assessment procedures in terms 
of suitability for science or knowledge relates to the criteria applied to evaluate the 
subject of assessment. It should be obvious that a useful assessment criterion for 
a scientific discipline such as pathological anatomy (for example, the number of 
citations in an English-only journal database) can be an even damaging standard to 
evaluate research quality within Hispanic philology (due to the inherent ties between 
the language of publication and the language of the research field). If the assessment 
criteria are inappropriate or ill-adapted, the public direction of science and research 
through assessment procedures will be dysfunctional or even harmful for knowledge 
advancement. And this is not allowed by Art. 20(1)(b) CE (freedom of research) 
read in conjunction with Art. 44(2) CE (providing for the public duty of promoting 
science and research). I believe that the current debate on research assessment, and 
particularly on humanities research assessment, should be largely focused on this 
aspect 58.
Any criteria or standards that can be expressed numerically (for instance, the 
number of publications or the amount of funding obtained from agreements under 
Art. 83 LOU) should be considered quantitative criteria. Self-evidently, the advan-
tages of these criteria are that they are easily manageable, they allow for lightening 
the workload attached to the assessment, they enable comparability and, where ac-
55 See WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2011: 31.
56 See WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2011: 32.
57 On this aspect, in Germany, see WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2011: 24-27.
58 On this discussion, see, among others, Michael OCHSNER, Sven HUG and Ioana GALLE-
RON, “The future of research assessment in the humanities: bottom-up assessment procedures”, Pal-
grave communications. 3:17020 doi: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.20.
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cepted by the relevant scientific community, they boldly legitimize decisions. How-
ever, remarkably, an increase in research activities sometimes has a diminishing mar-
ginal utility; for example, an extremely high number of PhD holders could evidence 
a bad PhD direction or low quality dissertation advisors 59. Qualitative criteria (e.g., 
assessing whether the reasoning contained in a monograph is precise and under-
standable) call for a description of the relevant contents, they make evaluations dif-
ficult, and they are often more vulnerable, since they are exposed to other subjective 
judgments 60. 
3.3.  Research assessment tools:  
bibliometric indicators and peer review
For the purposes of this paper, assessment tools means the specific methods used 
to evaluate the relevant subject of assessment. Within these tools, we will deal with 
indicators, i.e., mostly quantitative instruments that can be expressed numerically, 
as well as with peer review, which could be considered the par excellence qualitative 
tool.
Self-evidently, indicators (for instance, the number of citations of a journal where 
an article has been published) do not assess actual quality. Rather, they refer the 
assessment to other variables that may be related (although not necessarily) to qual-
ity 61. Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to claim that these indicators have noth-
ing to do with quality: a paper is published in a journal with a high impact factor 
only following a highly stringent assessment 62. Bibliometric indicators are based on 
the application of mathematical and statistical methods to bibliographic informa-
tion. Both the Science Citation Index (SCI) and the Social Sciences Citation Index 
(SSCI), subsequently created for social sciences, are very well-known. A journal’s 
impact factor shows the yearly average number of citations that papers published in 
a given journal received. Due to their shortcomings, these indicators have drawn 
criticism from scientific communities. As a result, increasingly more sophisticated 
indicators have been created, such as, for instance the h-index or Hirsch Index 63.
Generally, these indicators are based on data recorded in English journals, and 
they disregard monographs and chapters in books, which are frequently used as pub-
59 See WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2011: 38.
60 In this connection, see LIENHARD et al., 2016: 171.
61 See LIENHARD et al., 2016: 170.
62 See LIENHARD et al., 2016: 106.
63 This index was created in 2005 by Jorge E. HIRSCH. A researcher’s h-index will equal h where 
h of his/her scholarly works receive a number of citations equal or greater than h. For example, Stephen 
W. HAWKING had an h-index of 62: he had published 62 papers that had been cited at least 62 times 
each. On this matter, see Pablo SALVADOR CODERCH, Albert AZAGRA MALO and Carlos GÓ-
MEZ LIGÜERRE, “Criterios de evaluación de la actividad investigadora en Derecho civil, Derecho 
privado y análisis del Derecho”, InDret, 3/2008, pp. 14-15.
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lication channels for humanities and social sciences 64 .Thus, many social science 
and humanities scholars strongly reject these indicators for the assessment of their 
scholarly output in those fields. Citation impact data often privilege “hot topics” 
as well as prestigious and renowned scholars. Accordingly, the impact of younger 
researchers and alternative topics (i.e., unconventional) or specialized research (as 
opposed to works with a broader scope or less specific) is downplayed. Also, note 
that a bad article can be highly cited yet for critical purposes 65. A wave of rejection to 
the dictatorship of bibliometrics gave rise to the 2012 San Francisco Declaration on 
Research Assessment 66, an outcry against journal-based metrics which, according to 
the Declaration, were originally created as a tool to help librarians identify journals 
to purchase but ended up being measures of the scientific quality of research.
University rankings pose similar (or even more serious) issues. The most famous 
ones are the Top University rankings published by the Jiao Tong University in Shang-
hai 67 and the Times Higher Education World University Rankings 68. There are also 
ratings aimed at comparing disciplines or university schools. Much has already been 
said about how the criteria underlying these comparative lists are ill-founded or un-
substantiated, and enough has been written about the lack of transparency of the 
procedures used to prepare these rankings. Nevertheless, they most certainly trigger 
competition both at a national and international level 69. The U-Multirank 70 rank-
ing, within the framework of a European Commission initiative, is based on a meth-
odological approach which has expressly shifted away from other approaches that 
allow to reward UK and US universities and colleges. There is certainly no objection 
to the information provided by a ranking based on valid and transparent criteria for 
comparison, or on assessments performed by researchers or scientists. It is quite ob-
vious that public authorities cannot acritically embrace private rankings and ratings 
as a basis for public decision-making 71.
As stated above, peer review is the paramount example of qualitative research 
assessment, which amounts to an expression of institutionalized self-monitoring of 
research 72. When performing this role, evaluators or peer reviewers are the gatekeep-
ers to the positive outcomes of the assessment procedure (a publication, an accred-
itation or the award of project funding). The success of peer review requires a set 
of standards acknowledged by the relevant scholars and to which they should feel 
bound 73. A “mid-range distance” 74 between peer reviewers and evaluated scholars 
64 See SECKELMANN, 2018: 381; and OCHSNER et al., 2017: 9.
65 This critical remarks can be found in EMBID TELLO, 2017: 256, 265.
66 DORA: San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment; available at: https://sfdora.org/
67 https://cwur.org/2019-2020.php
68 https://www.timeshighereducation.com
69 See WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2011: 23-24.
70 https://www.umultirank.org/
71 See SECKELMANN, 2018: 462.
72 WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2011: 16.
73 In this connection, LIENHARD et al., 2016: 116.
74 SECKELMANN, 2018: 374.
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is also necessary for the well-functioning of peer review. However, this is not always 
feasible in small scientific communities. Whoever requests a peer review should pro-
vide the evaluator with good predefined forms or standardized reporting templates 
(appropriately breaking down the relevant criteria) for him/her to prepare the report. 
Also, peer reviewers must specifically answer the questions included in the forms or 
checklists 75. The Internet does allow for, and it is actually giving rise to, alternative 
forms of online peer review.
Peer review draws criticism for its limited intersubjectivity 76 and due to its bias 
against interdisciplinarity and innovation 77. If peer reviewers take their role as guard-
ians of existing standards too seriously, innovations can be delayed and paradigm 
shifts could be halted 78. We need to reflect on the selection of peer reviewers, since it 
can allow to somehow pre-determine the result of the evaluation by whoever requests 
the peer review report. Perhaps, the peer review process will improve if review-writ-
ing is carefully followed up on by the requesting body, if the peer reviewer is in-
formed about the decisions made based on the reports, or if the evaluator receives 
other reports drafted on the same subject as his/hers for comparison purposes 79.
It is essential to ensure the peer reviewer’s objectivity and impartiality. It is debat-
able whether Arts. 23 and 24 of the Act on the Legal Regime applicable to Public 
Authorities –Ley 40/2015, de 1 de octubre, de Régimen Jurídico del Sector Público or 
LRJSP– (on the standing down and recusation or challenge of public authorities) 
apply directly to peer reviewers involved in the administrative procedures examined 
herein. It is unclear if these scientists are “authorities” or “public staff” within the 
meaning of Art. 23 LRJSP. However, the underlying regulatory rationale of these 
provisions, i.e., preventing conflicts of interest in order to ensure impartiality, should 
also govern these procedures, even if it is through other specific rules tailored to 
research and science, such as those laid down in codes of ethics or assessment forms 
used by public authorities conducting research assessment procedures.
Within this context, it is also worth examining the anonymity of peer reviewers. 
They would rather draft their report anonymously in order to perform their review 
more freely. This is objectively advantageous for science. Conversely, reviewed schol-
ars seek as much information as possible on their reviewers, in order to get a grasp 
of the evaluator’s competence or expertise 80. On top of that, anonymity obviously 
prevents challenging reviewers. On this matter, regarding public resource allocation 
procedures, Art. 5(2) of the 2011 Act on Science is worded as follows: “The ano-
nymity of peer reviewers will be preserved in any peer review process, although they 
will be identified in the relevant administrative file in order for the parties concerned 
75 OCHSNER et al., 2017: 9.
76 OCHSNER et al., 2017: 9.
77 LIENHARD et al., 2016: 120.
78 In this vein, WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, Peer Review in Higher Education and Research, Position 
Paper, 2017, p. 8.
79 WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2017: 28.
80 WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2017: 11.
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to exercise any rights to which they may be entitled”. Admittedly, the latter part 
of the sentence does not have the most expressive wording. One could argue that 
anonymizing peer review is a rule “well -suited” for science encouraging scientific 
creation and thus sufficiently meaningful as to be weighed against the concerned 
party’s right of access to information regarding the reviewer’s identity, as in other 
information requests that may undermine “the secrecy required in decision-making 
procedures” under Art. 14(1)(k) of Act 19/2013, of December 9, on transparen-
cy, access to public information and good governance. Where anonymity prevented 
challenging an evaluator, it would be necessary to provide for an alternative guaran-
tee, such as the need to request two reviews.
Public authorities have a major duty: ensuring, in cooperation with science and 
researchers, that the criteria and methods used in assessment procedures be “well- 
suited” for science. When deciding on these, which are central for performance eval-
uation in academia, the following aspects should be taken into account. First, the 
type of assessment being carried out, since there is a large difference between assess-
ing the overall performance of a given university (where quantitative criteria and 
bibliometric indicators might play a more prominent role) and evaluating the schol-
arly output of a researcher applying for tenure or promotion (where exclusively using 
quantitative standards should be outright excluded) 81. Second, it could be accepted 
that assessments be designed based on a cost-benefit analysis (i.e., having regard to 
the cost of conducting the procedure and the benefits obtained from the inclusion of 
more complex or costly tools 82); the easy application of bibliometric indicators does 
not justify the use of bibliometrics in every case, but it would also be unreasonable to 
set aside bibliometric indicators in favour of the most expensive and time consuming 
assessment methods. Finally, scientific communities are responsible for engaging in 
the design of reasonable and appropriate methods to assess research within each of 
the relevant fields 83.
Further elaborating on these ideas can improve research assessment results. If 
solely the number of a researcher’s publications can trigger negative effects (such as 
the aforesaid “salami slicing” technique), this figure can be replaced by a maximum 
number of the most relevant publications. The 2015 amendment to the accredita-
tion procedure included this idea. The said amendment provided that the applica-
tion whereby researchers (seeking to achieve tenure or a promotion) initiate this 
accreditation procedure should include “the four contributions that the applicant 
considers to be the most relevant throughout his/her research career, in order for the 
competent committees to assess the quality and impact of the researcher’s output 
within his/her field of expertise” 84. A reasonable, well-balanced use of indicators 
shows that some bibliometric indicators can provide useful support to reports issued 
81 See WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2017: 39.
82 In this connection, see WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2017: 24.
83 Along these lines, LIENHARD et al., 2016: 124.
84 See Art. 14(2)(a) 2 of Decree 1312/2007, of October 5, on the national accreditation to achieve 
tenure following the amendment provided by Decree 415/2015, of May 29.
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within the context of the so-called “informed peer review:” reviewers are asked i) to 
assess the set of bibliometric data according to their value within their field, and ii) 
to subsequently issue their report based on this premise 85. For certain kinds of as-
sessments, such as research project evaluation, more efficient assessment procedures 
could be designed, for example: two-phase procedures, made up of a first stage where 
clear cases are identified (applications that are certainly being granted project fund-
ing and those for which there is no doubt that funding is denied), along with a group 
of applications that are halfway there for which a subsequent, more comprehensive 
peer review is requested. These two-phase procedures could also be made up of a first 
stage where the applicants are requested to submit summarized proposals; only the 
best ones are selected for the applicants to submit an extended application subject to 
an additional peer review 86.
3.4.  The assessment procedure
The notion of assessment procedure should only designate the administrative 
procedure (the broader category encompassing an assessment procedure and most 
certainly broader than a peer review process); in other words: the orderly series of 
proceedings and actions preceding and substantiating administrative decisions 87 that 
can be traced back to a public authority for which such public authority can be 
deemed responsible. Throughout this procedure, public authorities must ensure that 
all the information required for a correct assessment is duly gathered, as well as that 
the parties concerned are heard. The hearing stage following the experts’ assessment 
is expressly provided, for instance, in the national accreditation procedure for ten-
ure 88, as well as in (at least) some research project funding procedures 89 and in the 
procedure for the validation of official qualifications 90 (although this is a teaching 
evaluation procedure, not involving research assessment). As pointed out above, sci-
ence itself and researchers should be involved in the administrative procedure in or-
der to submit comments and share their views and criteria. However, the competent 
public body conducting the procedure must be responsible for dealing with other 
aspects related to the general interest 91: collecting all the necessary information to 
85 See EMBID TELLO, 2017: 265-266; WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2011: 40.
86 In this vein, WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2017: 25.
87 See Art. 70(1) (on the administrative file) of the Act on the standard administrative procedure 
for public authorities (LPAC).
88 Art. 57(3) LOU.
89 See Art. 17 of the Resolution issued by the State Secretariat for Universities, Research, Develop-
ment and Innovation along with the Chair of the National Research Agency (AEI), opening the call for 
an expedited processing of the 2019 funding allocation procedure for R&D&i projects “Challenges-
Cooperation” (“Retos-Colaboración”) of the Public Research, Development and Innovation Program for 
Social Challenges within the framework of the National Scientific, Technical and Innovation Research 
Program 2017-2020 (Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020).
90 See Art. 25(5) of Decree 1393/2007, of October 29, on official university studies.
91 In this connection, see SECKELMANN, 2018: 404-407.
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make a decision, meeting the relevant deadlines, ensuring the evaluators’ impartiality 
or objectivity, and protecting the legal rights and interests of the evaluated scholars.
4. TYPES OF RESEARCH ASSESSMENT IN SPANISH LAW
As has been stated, the subject of assessment procedures is not always exactly the 
same. Whereas sometimes a research work is directly evaluated (a doctoral disser-
tation, for example), the subject of an assessment procedure could very well be the 
entire research career of a researcher seeking tenure, a university’s research output 
altogether (which would amount to an institutional evaluation), or a research pro-
ject’s quality and feasibility (thus, a research project proposal or application would be 
undergoing evaluation). This section focuses on the specific subjects of assessment.
4.1. Direct assessment of research works
This subsection discusses the three most important research items subject to di-
rect assessment: doctoral dissertations (also referred to as doctoral theses), the five 
major contributions produced for each sexenio application (i.e., six-year research as-
sessments that can lead to an acknowledgment of research performance and a small 
salary increase), and the manuscripts submitted to public publishers or journals for 
publication or for public awards.
The oldest research assessment procedure is the one evaluating doctoral disser-
tations, i.e., scholarly works aimed at obtaining a PhD or doctorate degree. The 
applicable rules and regulations solely require that doctoral dissertations be “original 
research contributions” 92, whose defence or presentation should be authorized by a 
university collegiate body or committee 93 and whose scientific value must be assessed 
by a board made up of a variable number of members (often three or five) 94 who 
should be doctors with expertise in the field. The evaluation of doctoral dissertations 
amounts to a non-anonymous peer review subject to often implied quality standards 
allegedly known by the researchers in each field. Obviously, the doctoral dissertation 
approval and evaluation should also allow to identify (and, where appropriate, pe-
nalize) research malpractice by the doctoral candidate. When a politician takes office, 
journalists often inquire about, and often disclose, possible research malpractice. 
This assessment of research malpractice should become an essential element of the 
academic evaluation undergone to be awarded a PhD.
92 See Arts. 38 LOU and 13(1) of Decree 99/2011, of January 28, on official doctoral studies.
93 See Art. 2(6) of Decree 99/2011, of January 28, on official doctoral studies.
94 For example, in the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM), see Art. 2(2) of the procedural 
rules on the board of examiners (also designated as doctoral dissertation reading committee or, in Spa-
nish, “tribunal”), presentation or defence, and evaluation of doctoral dissertations in UAM (passed in 
2012 and amended several times since then).
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Research works are also subject to direct assessment in the procedure for the 
granting of sexenios 95. The researcher applying for a sexenio picks five of his/her con-
tributions from at least the last unassessed six-year period which he/she voluntarily 
submits for assessment by the CNEAI’s advisory bodies. In 1989, these sexenios or 
six-year research assessments were evaluations that could only give rise to a mere pro-
ductivity bonus for tenured faculty 96. However, they are currently a cornerstone of 
the Spanish university system with major legal consequences, including the follow-
ing: in order to be eligible for the accreditation committees (for tenure applications), 
any researcher should have been granted two or three sexenios, as appropriate 97; three 
sexenios are required to be a member of the CNEAI’s advisory committees 98; Asso-
ciate Professors (profesores titulares) and Full Professors (catedráticos) are entitled to 
reduce their maximum teaching load from 24 to 16 ECTS credits, respectively, if 
they have been acknowledged three or four sexenios 99.
As has been duly noted before, the organizational and procedural regulation of 
these assessments, laid down in regulatory (non-statutory) provisions 100, does not 
seem to meet the requirements of the constitutional reserva de ley principle enshrined 
in Art. 53(1) CE in connection with Art. 20(1)(b). The rules governing the granting 
of sexenios are so important within research activity, both subjectively (for researchers) 
and objectively (for research advancement in Spain), that any interpretative criteri-
on, at least of Art. 53(1) CE (the requirement that fundamental rights be governed 
by statutory provisions) should lead to the conclusion that the main organizational 
and procedural pillars of research assessment (and the effects thereof ) should be gov-
erned by an Act of Parliament or statute.
In my view, there are several salient aspects in terms of the organizational and 
procedural regulation of this assessment. First, it should be clearly set forth that the 
granting of a sexenio must not be rejected without the active involvement of an expert 
in the same field as the evaluated researcher (either belonging to the advisory com-
mittee or drafting an external report). What suits best the rules of research or science 
is that a negative assessment should only be issued by a researcher whose expertise 
in the relevant field allows him or her to know the discipline’s rulebook from the 
95 On this procedure, see the recent work of Severiano FERNÁNDEZ RAMOS, “Tramos de in-
vestigación y transparencia”, in Fernando LÓPEZ RAMÓN, Ricardo RIVERO ORTEGA and Marcos 
M. FERNANDO PABLO (coord.), Organización de la Universidad y la ciencia, Madrid, 2018, pp. 273 
et seq.
96 See Art. 2(4) of Decree 1086/1989, of August 28, on the remuneration of university faculty 
members.
97 Art. 6(2) of Decree 1312/2007, of October 5, on the national accreditation to achieve tenure.
98 Art. 9(2) of the CNEAI Internal Regulations (enacted by Ministerial Order ECI/3184/2005, 
of October 6).
99 Art. 68(2) LOU.
100 In particular, in the CNEAI Internal Regulations (enacted by Ministerial Order ECI/3184/2005, 
of October 6); and in Ministerial Order, of December 2, 1994, providing for the procedure to assess 
research activity implementing Decree 1086/1989, of August 28, on the remuneration of university 
faculty members.
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inside 101. Furthermore, there is no reason for this administrative procedure not to 
include a hearing for the evaluated researcher to submit comments on a negative as-
sessment 102. This hearing should resemble the most modern accreditation procedure 
regulation 103. The decision rejecting the sexenio can obviously be challenged before 
the same administrative authority which made it and before the courts.
The quality criteria or standards governing the assessment of the top five contri-
butions submitted by each researcher are laid down in a yearly CNEAI Resolution 
issued in parallel to the call for applications. At least regarding the assessment of 
researchers under Field 9 (“Law and Legal Science”), the definition of these quality 
criteria is fairly appropriate. These criteria are as follows: “originality, rigour, meth-
odology and impact” of the scholarly works will be taken into account; also, those 
works that “bring knowledge and provide conceptual and analytical instruments to 
render legal rules more effective” will be given particular consideration. However, 
“merely descriptive works or the repetition of previous contributions will be disre-
garded” 104. Admittedly, these criteria are well-suited for science and, in particular, 
for legal science. The grounds for the assessment decisions should obviously focus 
on giving reasons for any positive or negative evaluations subject to the aforesaid 
criteria.
The Spanish Supreme Court has recently ruled on the subject of assessment for 
the granting of sexenios (“the works or contributions included in the abbreviated 
CV”, i.e., the top five contributions picked by the researcher). The Supreme Court 
has construed the applicable regulation as meaning that the assessment will depend 
on the content of the submitted contributions, and not on the publication “in jour-
nals or other media included in (certain) indices or lists” 105. It is worth focusing on 
the contents, not on the strict application of journal indices that can be inappropri-
ate or ill-adapted to assess certain disciplines.
However, the contents should not always be fully separated from their package. 
As discussed below, in a different context, the results of scientific research do not only 
amount to the very expressed ideas. Research findings should be part of a communi-
cation process where ideas are received and reported again. The quality of scientific 
research depends to a great extent on correctly matching the findings with the con-
text of communication to make them known 106. A scientific idea disseminated in a 
non-scientific journal cannot be assessed as a research finding.
101 On this topic, see RODRÍGUEZ DE SANTIAGO, 2012: 245-247.
102 This hearing is neither provided in Art. 9 of the said Ministerial Order of December 2, 1994, 
nor granted in practice.
103 See Art. 57(3) LOU.
104 See Section 4 of the criteria for Field 9 of the Resolution issued by CNEAI on November 14, 
2018 disclosing the specific criteria approved for each of the fields of assessment. Available at: https://
www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2018-16138
105 Supreme Court Judgment of June 12, 2018 (cassation appeal no. 1281/2017), legal basis 5 
and 6.
106 See SCHULZE-FIELITZ, 2002: 16.
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The foregoing determines in different ways, and according to each discipline or 
field of research, the activity of evaluators in the procedures for the granting of se-
xenios. Within the law domain, as in the case settled by Supreme Court Judgment 
of June 12, 2018, no international journal index preventing the consideration of 
research works published elsewhere can be used (these indexes might exist in other 
disciplines). Nevertheless, a non-prestigious journal that is not widely circulated and 
which does not assess manuscripts is also inappropriate to ensure whether there has 
been a contribution to science. If there is a guarantee that the journal carries out a 
strict editorial selection process, the sexenio evaluator need not perform any addi-
tional content assessment: such an evaluation has already been carried out within the 
non-public research system. On the contrary, the sexenio evaluator will have to assess 
the contents published in more standard media for legal research not subject to peer 
review, such as monographs (for which, obviously, the publisher’s standing could be 
taken into account), chapters of co-authored or collective books, etc.
Generally, the sexenio procedure increasingly ensures high-quality assessments of 
research quality (redundancy intended). Thus, in line with the aforesaid data mini-
mization principle –i.e., to use little (yet meaningful) research quality indicators in 
any research evaluation where those indicators may be significant and allow not to 
add information 107- it is appropriate to use this indicator (using formulas where the 
number of sexenios that could have been possibly granted is divided over the number 
of awarded sexenios) to lighten the burden of producing additional information for 
other assessments, such as universities’ research performance assessments for Region-
al Government’s funding decisions, evaluations of university schools’ scholarly out-
put for internal funding decisions (within the university) involving grants or other 
financial resources, etc. The specificities of every discipline are taken into account 
for each evaluator’s assessment, and the sexenio indicator complies with the formal 
equality of all disciplines.
Finally, the evaluation of manuscripts submitted for publication in journals and pu-
blishing houses or presented to awards also qualifies as a direct research assessment 
procedure. These evaluations should probably be considered public procedures as 
long as the journal owners 108 or the award-giving bodies are public (let’s take, for 
instance, the extraordinary doctorate award given by many universities). Broadly 
speaking, the public nature of these entities simply reinforces the requirement that 
these procedures abide by the rules of science.
107 See WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2011: 39.
108 The Revista de Administración Pública and the Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional are 
published by the Center for Political and Constitutional Studies (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Consti-
tucionales). The journal titled Documentación Administrativa is published by the National Institute for 
Public Administration (Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública). As is well-known, there are many 
other examples.
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4.2. Research project assessment
The evaluation of research projects entails the prior quality assessment of a work 
plan aimed at achieving knowledge-related results. This prior assessment is intended 
to allocate the relevant financial resources to the best proposals, which will be se-
lected following a competitive procedure 109. Not selecting only the best proposals, 
as they have been submitted, and having regard to resource availability, but increas-
ing the number of funded (selected) projects by deciding, ex officio, to allocate less 
funding than requested to all or most of the selected proposals, would amount to a 
misallocation of resources. Self-evidently, reducing the funds granted to the (truly) 
best proposals can have a negative effect on their schedules or plans of action.
The National Research Agency (AEI) plays a very prominent role within these 
procedures, but this is not the only relevant actor 110. Upon the submission of appli-
cations, these are pre-assessed. Following this pre-assessment, applicants who fail to 
meet those requirements “that do not involve a scientific or technical evaluation 111” 
are excluded. The scientific evaluation of requests provides for some of the aforesaid 
mechanisms aimed at streamlining procedures. This evaluation can take place in 
one or two stages. In the first case, at the beginning of the procedure, applicants 
will submit any information required to assess the proposal. As for two-phase eval-
uations, applicants will submit a simplified set of documents during the first stage; 
at this point, the assessment is solely based on essential criteria (for instance, the 
“originality of the proposal and its disruptive nature”), so that applications failing to 
meet these requirements are outright excluded. At the second stage, applicants are 
requested to submit additional documents, which are assessed under a set of general 
criteria discussed below. The relevant committees subsequently issue the proposed 
decisions (draft resolutions) in light of the expert reports on each of the applications 
or proposals. These committees can be made up of a majority of researchers (along 
with public officials, whether holding political positions or not), but it is surprising 
that this composition is not mandatory 112. As a general rule, the applicants must be 
heard prior to the final decision 113.
The criteria or standards applied to assess the applications (both numerically and 
in terms of reasoning) are conceived in quite an abstract manner, namely: proposal’s 
quality and feasibility, research team, or scientific-technical and social and economic 
109 The regulatory approach is taken from Ministerial Order CNU/320/2019, of March 13, ap-
proving the regulatory framework for the granting of public financial aid within the National Program 
for Knowledge Generation and Scientific and Technological Advancement of the R&D&i System 
and within the framework of the Public Research, Development and Innovation Program for Social 
Challenges within the National Scientific, Technical and Innovation Research Program 2017-2020 
(Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020) addressed to research and 
knowledge dissemination bodies.
110 See Art. 16 of the said Ministerial Order CNU/320/2019.
111 See Art. 18 of Ministerial Order CNU/320/2019.
112 See Art. 19 of Ministerial Order CNU/320/2019.
113 See paragraphs (3) and (4) of Art. 21 of Ministerial Order CNU/320/2019.
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impact of the results 114. These criteria are the same for all fields of research. Appar-
ently, this poses no problem whatsoever, since any research project, regardless of 
the discipline, is always a prospective work plan generally assessable under the said 
abstract criteria (quality, feasibility, research team...). Arguably, “economic impact” 
is the only criterion that could privilege certain fields of research.
During the implementation of research projects, there are partial assessments 
(“follow-ups” to assess partial compliance with the projected results or set mile-
stones), as well as an ex post evaluation of the findings. Negative results of these 
assessments and follow-ups “may be taken into account when the party concerned 
submits a new funding application (…) in the aspects regarding the research team or 
the proposal’s quality 115”. It would be desirable that researchers be informed of these 
unfavourable assessments, as well as that the negative consequences arising therefrom 
not be based on the unknown “blacklisting” of researchers by the AEI.
4.3. Assessment of researchers
The most significant procedures aimed at evaluating a scholar’s research career are 
accreditation procedures, competitive procedures to gain tenure and internal promo-
tion procedures within universities.
The 2001 Constitutional (Organic) Act on Universities (LOU) laid down the re-
quirement that, following the positive assessment of the relevant applicant’s CV, any 
applicants seeking a position as Assistant Lecturer (ayudante doctor), Senior Lectur-
er (contratado doctor) or Private University Faculty (profesor de universidad privada) 
should obtain the ANECA accreditation (or otherwise an accreditation issued by the 
equivalent regional public body 116). The 2007 amendment to the LOU 117 set the 
same requirement in order to be accredited by ANECA to achieve a tenured position 
114 See Annex III to Ministerial Order CNU/320/2019.
115 See Art. 27(4) of Ministerial Order CNU/320/2019.
116 See Arts. 50(a) (Assistant Lecturer), 52(a) (Senior Lecturer) and 72(2) (Private University Fa-
culty) of the LOU. This accreditation procedure was further implemented by Decree 1052/2002, of 
October 11, regulating the procedure for the assessment and subsequent certification thereof by the 
National Quality Assurance and Accreditation Agency (Agencia Nacional de Evaluación de la Calidad y 
Acreditación or ANECA), for the purpose of hiring university faculty. The assessment criteria were laid 
down by two soft law instruments: i) Annex IV to the Resolution issued by the General Directorate for 
Universities on February 18, 2005 modifying certain aspects related to the ANECA assessment appli-
cation procedure for the hiring of university faculty, as well as the assessment criteria, set forth in Reso-
lutions issued by the General Directorate for Universities on October 17, 2002 and June 24, 2003; and 
ii) a document titled “Principles and guidelines for the application of assessment criteria” (“Principios y 
orientaciones para la aplicación de los criterios de evaluación”) available on ANECA’s website.
117 Made by Constitutional (Organic) Act 4/2007, of April 12, amending Constitutional (Or-
ganic) Act 6/2001, of December 21, on Universities. The accreditation to achieve a tenured position 
as Associate Professor (profesor titular) or Full Professor (catedrático) is governed by Arts. 57, 59 and 
60 LOU, implemented by Decree 1312/2007, of October 5, on the national accreditation to achieve 
tenure.
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(following a competitive procedure) as Associate Professor (profesor titular) or Full 
Professor (catedrático) 118. The soft law criteria provided by the said public agency to 
assess scholars’ research careers followed the same structure in every case: on the one 
hand, there was a list of merits or achievements (in terms of research, teaching, man-
agement, etc.), where each merit or achievement was credited with points. On the 
other, a minimum number of points for each position (either tenured or tenure-track 
positions) was established. The specific evaluation of research was not quality blind, 
but –generally speaking– quantity prevailed over quality 119.
The system has remained unchanged since then for tenure-track positions. How-
ever, in 2015 120, the assessment procedure for the accreditation to achieve a tenured 
position (Associate Professors or Full Professors) was modified 121. This amendment 
was expressly intended to underscore qualitative criteria; as provided in the Explana-
tory Preamble of Decree 415/2015, the point was to conduct “a more well-balanced 
assessment, striking a fair balance between the quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
the applicant’s merits or achievements 122”.
To that end, the number of the evaluation committees was increased in order 
to bring the experts “closer” to the fields of research of the evaluated scholars. Ad-
ditionally, the point system was replaced 123 by a letter rating system based on the 
quality of the merits or achievements (“A” being outstanding, “B” being good…), 
provided that a minimum quantity threshold is met. Also, and this clearly shows 
how the amendment is keen on highlighting quality, applicants were required to 
identify “the four contributions that the applicant considers to be the most relevant 
throughout his/her research career, in order for the competent committees to assess 
118 On this matter, see Juan Manuel ALEGRE ÁVILA, “El nuevo sistema de selección del pro-
fesorado universitario funcionario”, Revista Española de Derecho Administrativo, no. 135, 2007, pp. 
437-457.
119 For instance, see Araceli MANGAS, “La evaluación de la investigación jurídica en España”, El 
Cronista del Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, no. 23, 2011, pp. 60-71, specifically, pp. 63-64; 
Gabriel DOMÉNECH, “Que innoven ellos. Por qué la ciencia jurídica española es tan poco original, 
creativa e innovadora”, InDret 2/2016, pp. 15-19; EMBID TELLO, 2017: 259.
120 The amendment was performed through Decree 415/2015, of May 29, modifying Decree 
1312/2007, of October 5, on the national accreditation to achieve tenure.
121 On the precedents leading to the amendment, see Vicenç AGUADO I CUDOLÀ, “La selec-
ción de los cuerpos docentes universitarios: el sistema de acreditación”, Revista de Educación y Derecho, 
no. 10, 2014, pp. 8-9.
122 On the negative effects on researchers arising from the instability and fluctuations of assessment 
criteria, see Diana SANTIAGO IGLESIAS, “Algunas claves para el éxito del procedimiento de inno-
vación en el ámbito universitario”, in Fernando LÓPEZ RAMÓN, Ricardo RIVERO ORTEGA and 
Marcos M. FERNANDO PABLO (coord.), Organización de la Universidad y la ciencia, Madrid, 2018, 
pp. 474 et seq., specifically, pp. 477-478.
123 In favour, however, of a “strict and almost mathematical scaling system”, Gabriele VESTRI, “El 
acceso a la docencia-investigación en el sistema universitario español”, in Fernando LÓPEZ RAMÓN, 
Ricardo RIVERO ORTEGA and Marcos M. FERNANDO PABLO (coord.), Organización de la Uni-
versidad y la ciencia, Madrid, 2018, pp. 153 et seq., in particular, p. 160.
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the quality and impact of the researcher’s output within his/her field of expertise 124”. 
Those applying for the position of Full Professor (catedrático) should put forward 
further “specific merits”. Under this newly enacted regulation, Full Professors are no 
longer older, more prolific Associate Professors; they now attain a specific position 
as faculty members with a background of leadership and recognition external to the 
higher education institution where they carry out their teaching and research activ-
ity. Being a “main researcher” in research projects (Investigador Principal or IP) or a 
doctoral dissertation advisor, participating in international academic networks, or 
obtaining funding through knowledge transfer agreements are now achievements of 
paramount importance to become a Full Professor.
The amendment was truly undermined by the soft law document passed in 2017 
by ANECA’s Law evaluation committee titled “Assessable merits” (“Méritos evalua-
bles 125”). This document fails to include a minimum threshold of merits or achieve-
ments that could provide the basis to subsequently rate the quality of contributions 
under the said letter system. Quite the opposite: the document provides, ad nauseam, 
a set of “compulsory merits” required to get an “A” in research (Full Professor po-
sition: 6 monographs, 20 book chapters, 20 papers; Associate Professor position: 3 
monographs, 10 book chapters, 10 articles). Other “compulsory merits” to get a “B” 
in research are, for Full Professors, 4 monographs, 15 book chapters and 15 articles, 
and, for Associate Professors, 2 monographs, 6 book chapters and 6 articles.
Ultimately, this piece of soft law essentially ignores the clear direction set by the 
hard law provision (Decree 415/2015) for the discretionary decision making of pub-
lic authorities. On top of that, this soft law document reformulates or reshapes (in 
quantitative terms) the committees’ obligation to assess the quality of the submitted 
achievements 126.
The university competitive procedures to achieve tenure-track or tenured positions 
(concursos de acceso, in Spanish) also qualify as procedures for the assessment of schol-
ars’ research careers. This is particularly true regarding tenured positions (Associ-
ate Professors and Full Professors). In each of these concursos, and specially for the 
achievement of the latter positions, universities make a long-term decision regarding 
the future approach, content and significance of a given discipline within the insti-
tution 127. These competitive procedures or concursos are governed by Art. 62 LOU, 
which refers to each university’s regulations to further provide for the procedural 
124 See the 2nd indent of Art. 14(2)(a) of Decree 1312/2007, following the amendment provided 
by Decree 415/2015, of May 29.
125 Available at: http://www.aneca.es/Programas-de-evaluacion/Evaluacion-de-profesorado/ACA-
DEMIA/Criterios-de-evaluacion-noviembre-2017
126 See Alba NOGUEIRA, “Doce notas y una reflexión sobre el modelo de Universidad y empleo 
público docente que propician los criterios de acreditación en Derecho”, in Fernando LÓPEZ RA-
MÓN, Ricardo RIVERO ORTEGA and Marcos M. FERNANDO PABLO (coord.), Organización de 
la Universidad y la ciencia, Madrid, 2018, pp. 283 et seq., in particular, pp. 288-289.
127 WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, Perspektiven der Rechtswissenschaft in Deutschland. Situation, Analy-
sen, Empfehlungen, 2012, p. 47.
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and composition rules applicable to evaluation committees. Paragraph 4 of Art. 62 
LOU more specifically defines the subject of assessment: 1) the applicant’s academic, 
teaching and research background; 2) the applicant’s teaching and research project 
(what he/she has to offer in terms of teaching and research to the university opening 
the call for positions), and 3) the applicant’s public speaking and debate abilities in 
the relevant field. The specific research assessment criteria for the applicants are laid 
down by the committee deciding on each concurso 128.
Over the last few years, spontaneously and somewhat disregarding the applicable 
legislation (probably as a collateral effect of the economic downturn), universities 
are suddenly conducting a new procedure to assess scholars’ research career: the pro-
cedure aimed at calling for the misleadingly designated “promotion positions” (in 
Spanish, “plazas de promoción”). During the long economic recession, no new po-
sitions were opened up, thus preventing faculty members to promote. Accordingly, 
there are many Senior Lecturers (contratados doctores) that are still in that position, 
in spite of having been accredited for an Associate Professor position for a while. 
This is also the case with Associate Professors seeking a Full Professor spot; they have 
achieved their full professorship accreditation long ago, yet they remain Associate 
Professors.
Universities are implementing internal “promotion” procedures (or position “up-
grades”) which, in their simplest version, work as follows: a given associate profes-
sorship, for example, of whoever has been accredited for a Full Professor position the 
longest, turns (in the budget) into a full professorship by increasing the resources 
allocated to that position. There is a call for this new Full Professor position through 
an allegedly competitive concurso (although the position is not vacant, but rather 
held by an Associate Professor); the university opening up the position hopes for 
the Associate Professor holding the position to be the successful applicant. If this 
happens, everything works as expected and the Associate Professor becomes a Full 
Professor. However, if a better applicant is awarded the position, he/she will take the 
spot and the university will be forced to create a new budgetary accommodation for 
the applicant who has been set aside and has to remain as an Associate Professor. The 
system’s expectation is that this rarely or never occurs.
Self evidently, this procedure poses serious concerns from the perspective of civil 
service law and budgetary legislation. Internal (vertical) promotion (Art. 18 of the 
Public Employment Act, TRLEBEP) revolves around positions that are opened up 
based on service needs, not solely for internal promotion purposes. Furthermore, it 
is obvious that tenured faculty positions to be filled through a competitive procedure 
or concurso (Arts. 62(1) LOU and 70 TRLEBEP) cannot be already filled, because if 
another applicant is awarded the position, a financial obligation arises (to accommo-
date the unsuccessful candidate) for which there was no budget allocation.
128 As for Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM), see, for instance, rule 5(4) on competitive 
procedures to achieve tenure (Resolution issued by the Rector or President on March 23, 2009 publis-
hing the Decision of the University’s Governing Board dated March 13, 2009).
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These procedures have more sophisticated versions, where the positions to be 
“promoted” or, better said, “upgraded”, are chosen after assessing the achievements 
(not only determining who has been accredited for the longest time) of the voluntary 
applicants to this internal procedure. Within these sophisticated versions, the follow-
ing aspects are taken into account: research merits or achievements (sexenios, having 
been a main researcher or IP in research projects...), teaching and management expe-
rience, etc. 129 Seniority in the accreditation (i.e., for how long an applicant has been 
accredited) is often significant, as well as simply the length of service in university. 
Understandably, placing a lot of importance on seniority in the accreditation (and, 
above all, in the length of service) without even tying it to a long-lasting research 
activity, creates an incentive which is “unsuitable” or “ill-adapted to science”, and 
that can jeopardize the achievement of the desired result (that the faculty member 
holding the position end up being awarded the “upgraded” position). As the merits 
or achievements considered for internal “promotion” move away from the achieve-
ments taken into account in the competitive concurso, the higher the risk that the 
desired result is not achieved. 
4.4. Institutional assessment of research
Institutional research assessment procedures evaluate research carried out by col-
lective units. This subsection discusses i) the assessment of universities’ research out-
put regarding performance-based funding; ii) the assessment of institutional projects 
(Excellence Campus or Campus de Excelencia), and iii) the evaluation of research 
groups.
The performance-based funding scheme for universities (concerning research, in 
particular) is well-known and it is implemented in many European countries 130. Ever 
since the 1990s, there are funding cooperation agreements or contratos-programa in 
Spain 131 entered into between a university and a regional public authority with pow-
ers in higher education matters. Under these contratos-programa, the relevant public 
authority provides extraordinary financial support if the relevant university accom-
plishes certain improvements in terms of research and, more importantly, in terms 
of teaching quality 132. The aforesaid “Funding scheme for public universities in the 
129 See, by way of example, the 2019 call of the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid: https://www.
uam.es/UAM/Convocatorias-Internas/1446772807610.htm?language=es
130 Concerning the German Leistungsorientierte Mittelvergabe (LOM) system, see WISSENS-
CHAFTSRAT, 2011: 23 et seq.
131 On this topic, see Fernando GURREA CASAMAYOR, “Los contratos-programa entre las 
Comunidades Autónomas y las Universidades: el modelo adoptado por la Comunidad Autónoma de 
Aragón”, Revista Aragonesa de Administración Pública, no. 18, 2001, pp. 319-356; and Luis Ignacio 
GORDILLO PÉREZ, “Los contratos-programa y la Universidad”, Revista Vasca de Administración Pú-
blica, no. 74, 2006, pp. 183-236.
132 See, for instance, Art. 88 of the Recast Text of the Andalusian Regional Act on Universities 
(enacted through Legislative Decree 1/2013, of January 8); Art. 53 of Regional Act 5/2005, of June 14, 
300 JOSÉ MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ DE SANTIAGO
Revista de Derecho Público: Teoría y Método Vol. 1 | Año 2020
Region of Madrid for 2006-2010” 133 and the “Multi-annual funding scheme of the 
Valencia Regional University System for 2010-2017” 134 apparently also give rise to 
competition between the various universities struggling for limited financial resourc-
es within the same budget item 135.
The assessment criteria regarding research activity are often the following: the 
amount of resources obtained in public competitive procedures as well as in private 
funding procedures subject to Art. 83 LOU; the sexenios obtained by researchers, as 
well as the number of doctoral dissertations and publications. As has been stated, 
given the amount of research activity subject to assessment, the data being used 
should be meaningful (actually evidencing the value of research output) and readily 
available. In case of competitive procedures, the applied criteria should also be ob-
jective 136, in order to avoid undue disadvantages for certain disciplines, as is the case 
when the amount of private funding obtained (which is always less for humanities) 
or the number of listed publications in English (which should not be used for fields 
intrinsically tied to a specific language, as most legal disciplines) are given an unrea-
sonable value.
Project assessment also has an institutional dimension. This dimension is embod-
ied in a competitive procedure whereby university projects are awarded funding for 
future strategic action to enhance teaching or research activity allowing to transform 
campuses by internationalizing them through networks and alliances. Amongst these 
procedures, the most famous one is the so-called Campus of International Excellence 
Program or Programa Campus de Excelencia Internacional 137, which has been in place 
since 2009. The assessment and selection procedure is two-phased. At a first stage, 
the applying universities submit an overview of their projects, which are subsequent-
ly reviewed by a technical committee 138. The selected overviews are granted funds to 
prepare the “Duly extended and specified project for transformation into a campus 
on the University System of Aragon; and Art. 48 of Regional Act 3/2003, of March 28, on Universities 
of Castilla y León.
133 See the document cited in footnote 47.
134 See the document cited in footnote 49.
135 On the ever-increasing importance placed on conditional funding of Spanish universities, see 
Carlos-Alberto AMOEDO-SOUTO, “Infrafinanciación cronificada, condicionalidad financiera y au-
tonomía universitaria: notas para un abordaje jurídico”, in Fernando LÓPEZ RAMÓN, Ricardo RI-
VERO ORTEGA and Marcos M. FERNANDO PABLO (coord.), Organización de la Universidad y la 
ciencia, Madrid, 2018, pp. 163 et seq.
136 On this matter, see Luis ARROYO JIMÉNEZ, “Las bases constitucionales de la actividad ad-
ministrativa de adjudicación de derechos limitados en número”, in Luis ARROYO and Dolores UTRI-
LLA (dirs.), La administración de la escasez. Los fundamentos de la actividad administrativa de adjudica-
ción de derechos limitados en número, Madrid, 2015, pp. 90 et seq.
137 Concerning the 2011 call, see Ministerial Order EDU/1539/2011, of June 2, including the call 
for funding applications for 2011 regarding the excellence sub-program of the Campus of International 
Excellence Program and implementing the procedure to grant the Campus of International Excellence 
award and to enter into agreements with Autonomous Regions (Regional Governments) within the 
scope of Ministerial Order EDU/903/2010, of April 8.
138 Art. 6 of the said Ministerial Order EDU/1539/2011, of June 2.
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of international excellence” (in Spanish, “proyecto de conversión a campus de excelen-
cia internacional debidamente desarrollado y concretado”). These extended projects are 
assessed by an international committee who decides who is awarded the funds to 
implement the projected actions 139.
The project assessment criteria are identified and scaled (roughly assigning the 
points to each criterion) in the call: teaching improvement, scientific improvement, 
definition of fields of specialization, internationalization, etc. 140. The time periods 
granted to prepare and submit the project overviews are surprisingly short, which is 
clearly contrary to the rules of science. Within a month (of summer, as in the 2011 
call) 141 or within a 5-day period (!) (as in the 2015 notice) 142, one can barely sketch 
a few general intuitions for a strategic university project. These time periods prevent 
internal debate within universities as well as the elaboration and reflection needed to 
guarantee the success of any proposal related to future scientific activity.
The abovementioned institutional research assessment procedures comprise the 
evaluation of research groups, i.e., units made up of researchers with shared lines of 
work 143. The assessment of this type of research activity should take into account an 
obvious rule of thumb: a group is not just the sum of its parts; rather, it is the quality 
of the combined collective work that must be assessed.
5.  CHARACTERISTICS OF LAW DEEMED SIGNIFICANT  
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF RESEARCH ASSESSMENT
Below, we specifically discuss legal research or, better said, research in the field of 
legal science. The design of legal research assessment procedures, and particularly the 
establishment of evaluation criteria, must have regard to some of this discipline’s spe-
cificities. Such distinct characteristics will determine, as a premise or starting point, 
whether these criteria and procedures are “well-suited” for law 144.
5.1.  Legal science hinges on hermeneutics and mostly deals  
with legislative texts
The set of ideas on sovereignty and State that can be traced back to Jean Bodin, 
and which historically lead to understanding law as a set of rules stemming from 
139 Art. 7 of Ministerial Order EDU/1539/2011, of June 2.
140 Art. 5 of Ministerial Order EDU/1539/2011, of June 2.
141 Art. 4(1) of Ministerial Order EDU/1539/2011, of June 2.
142 Section 5.1 of Resolution issued by the State Secretariat for Education, Vocational Training and 
Universities, calling funding applications for the consolidation of excellence projects for universities.
143 See, for instance, the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid regulations on research groups: 
https://www.uam.es/UAM/Grupos-de-Investigaci%C3%B3n/1242647861998.htm?language=es& 
nodepath=Grupos%20de%20Investigaci%C3%B3n
144 This approach can be found in LIENHARD et al., 2016: 34.
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a sovereign State, is essential to outline the notion of legal science. As opposed to 
natural and empirical disciplines, which inquire about facts, the science of law is 
concerned with what ought to be rather than with what it is. Accordingly, the science 
of law has its own methodology aimed at understanding these legislative texts (or 
texts with rules or legal provisions) driven by the notion of system, and shaped by the 
distinct features of unity, order and coherence 145. Legal scholarly work is based on 
forms of thought or lines of thinking seeking to describe and classify legal material 
for the purpose of analysing and explaining it 146. Legal research also hinges upon 
lines of reasoning intended to identify coherence or inconsistencies, to come up 
with enriching proposals and solutions, etc. Admittedly, there are major differences 
between civil law or administrative law scholars and legal theory scholars in how 
they work with legal rules. It is also true that empirical studies (focused on reality, on 
“what it is”), as conducted by behavioural disciplines and economic analysis of law 
scholars, have recently made a strong entrance in the field of legal research, and par-
ticularly regarding rulemaking theories 147. In spite of these nuances, the statement 
that the science of law is largely based on hermeneutics and legislative texts (or texts 
with rules or legal provisions) still holds true today.
Whereas natural sciences advocate a linear understanding of progress (the new 
supersedes the old), law (and humanities) are governed by the “coexistence of com-
peting ideas” from an increasingly large knowledge base. Generally, the findings of 
legal research can be challenged over and over. It is hard to seek a “final result” in 
legal research. Rather than aging or growing old, legal knowledge is constantly ex-
panding 148.
Law is largely a “science of books” 149, which does not often require expensive in-
frastructures 150. In light of this feature, assessing legal research based on the amount 
of private funding obtained from third parties is “ill-adapted” to legal science. If this 
criterion governed the internal allocation of funds or scholarships amongst university 
schools, law and humanities would be severely and unduly disadvantaged. If this 
criterion was the basis for the granting of Regional Government funds to universi-
ties (as is the case with the “Funding scheme for public universities in the Region 
145 See Claus-Wilhelm CANARIS, El sistema en la Jurisprudencia, translation into Spanish of the 
2nd German edition (Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz of 1983), Madrid, 1998, pp. 
20-21, 21-26, passim.
146 See the purpose of legal concepts highlighted by Silvia DÍEZ SASTRE, La formación de concep-
tos en el Derecho público. Un estudio de metodología académica: definición, funciones y criterios de formación 
de los conceptos jurídicos, Madrid, 2018, pp. 142 et seq.
147 On this topic, see, in a nutshell, Gabriel DOMÉNECH, “Por qué y cómo hacer análisis eco-
nómico del Derecho”, Revista de Administración Pública, no. 195, 2014, pp. 99-133, in particular, pp. 
112-114 and 120 et seq.
148 In this vein, see WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, Perspektiven der Rechtswissenschaft in Deutschland. 
Situation, Analysen, Empfehlungen, 2012, p. 29.
149 WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2012: 14.
150 OCHSNER et al., 2017: 3; LIENHARD et al., 2016: 170-171.
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of Madrid for 2006-2010” 151 and with the “Multi-annual funding scheme of the 
Valencia Regional University System for 2010-2017” 152), polytechnic universities or 
institutes of technology would be unduly rewarded over more humanities-oriented 
colleges. Those disciplines requiring more expensive infrastructure (which, to some 
extent, are also the better funded by third parties) need more resources to perform 
their research activity. However, this difference should be taken into account for the 
basic allocation of funds, but not for any additional performance-based funding 
decisions.
5.2. Ties between legal science and the practice of law
Law, just as medicine, falls within a group of disciplines taught and studied in 
schools with the aim of providing professional training, i.e., for students to be qual-
ified to practice a profession. They are academic disciplines characterized by a close 
relationship between theory and practice. Legal scholars are, on the one hand, mem-
bers of the social sub-system of scientific research; and, on the other, they belong to 
the legal social sub-system along with judges, lawyers and some public officials 153.
Natural sciences enable the distinction between basic research disciplines (also 
designated as fundamental or pure research) and applied fields of research. Never-
theless, within law itself, there is always a spectrum, ranging from attempts at grand, 
highly abstract theories, to legal studies and commentaries designed to solve specific 
problems. Law is a system of principles and rules aimed at solving social problems. 
Thus, although the science of law sometimes takes an abstract high ground, law is in-
evitably defined by the link between theory and practice: legal research departs from 
a theoretical foundation, whether large or small, but it should ultimately prepare 
(even remotely) or propose, practical solutions 154.
There are certain implications for research assessment that can be inferred from 
this feature of legal science. As a “science of books”, law will not attract large amounts 
of private funding to universities. But the ties between theory and practice in law 
do place legal researchers in a position to enter into knowledge transfer agreements 
subject to Art. 83 LOU 155. The amount of private funding obtained through these 
agreements will not be as high as that involved in the abovementioned applied re-
search. However, the number of agreements can be considered a well-suited indica-
tor for legal research.
151 See pp. 17 and 23 of the document cited in footnote 47.
152 See pp. 14 and 29 of the document cited in footnote 49.
153 WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2012: 5.
154 See SCHULZE-FIELITZ, 2002: 13-14.
155 On this matter, see Julia ORTEGA BERNARDO, “La transferencia de conocimiento en las 
Universidades: razones y claves de su articulación jurídica”, in Fernando LÓPEZ RAMÓN, Ricardo 
RIVERO ORTEGA and Marcos M. FERNANDO PABLO (coord.), Organización de la Universidad y 
la ciencia, Madrid, 2018, pp. 372 et seq.
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Furthermore, from the standpoint of research quality assessment, the ties be-
tween theory and practice also determine that “the more abstract, the better” is not 
necessarily true for law. Systematizing positive law in close connection with the actu-
al practice of law can be an outstanding work of legal research.
Additionally, the said link between theory and practice allows to positively assess 
a given academic proposal actually used by a court to settle a case-law issue or by the 
legislator to solve a problem by enacting a legal provision.
5.3.  The subject of legal science is segmented because it hinges  
on domestic legal orders
As opposed to math, physics or chemistry, the subject of study of legal science 
(legal provisions handled in a scientific manner) is not “transnational”. Rather, it is 
segmented into mostly domestic legal orders 156, i.e., legal frameworks largely de-
pendent on the power of the State enacting the relevant legal provisions. The pro-
gressive globalization, internationalization and Europeanization of domestic law is 
most certainly affecting this feature of law, which is otherwise absent in Roman law, 
public international law or EU law. Nonetheless, most of the traditional legal disci-
plines still deal with domestic legal systems.
Obviously, this essentially domestic nature should dictate the dissemination crite-
ria used to assess the publishing houses or journals where legal research is published. 
Most likely, a prestigious German journal on tax law will be more widely dissemi-
nated than a Spanish publication on the same subject, but the Spanish journal will 
have greater dissemination than a French-only Swiss publication. Data on journal 
dissemination and the fact that scholarly articles do not get into English journal 
databases, say nothing about the quality of articles published therein. There need to 
be different criteria to perform this quality assessment.
5.4.  Legal research is tied to the language of legal provisions
Legal science’s subject of study is shaped by language (legislative texts or texts 
with rules or legal provisions), and thus there are inextricable ties between legal re-
search and the cultural context of the relevant language in which legal provisions are 
drafted 157. This is not the case with medicine or astrophysics. In contrast with natural 
sciences or economics, as for disciplines that largely depend on national provisions, 
it is uncommon (and it would be fairly unreasonable) to publish articles in English. 
Yet again, using as a quality criterion the publication in journals listed in databases of 
mostly English-written works is generally unsuitable or ill-adapted to legal research.
156 In this vein, see LIENHARD et al., 2016: 34.
157 WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2012: 70.
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It is worth discussing research works published in languages spoken in Spain 
other than Castilian (Spanish); these are also official languages in their respective 
Autonomous Regions. Self-evidently, scholars who publish their works in Catalan or 
Basque will have fewer readers and citations than Spanish-written pieces. However, it 
is also obvious that such difference in readers and citations says nothing about qual-
ity 158. For instance, a scholar whose publications deal with Catalan civil law is defi-
nitely targeting a smaller scientific community than the Spanish civil law audience, 
considering the abovementioned link between the subject of legal research (civil law 
only applied in Catalonia) and the cultural context of the Catalan language.
However, regarding publications on national law written in co-official regional 
languages other than Castilian Spanish, we could further discuss whether or not the 
findings of a research work only amount to the ideas actually expressed on paper. 
These ideas should be framed within a communication process allowing to receive 
the thoughts and to subsequently communicate them again. The quality of scientific 
research largely depends on correctly matching the findings with the context of com-
munication to disseminate them 159. This match can be undermined if the language 
used reduces the scope of the scientific community interested in the subject-matter.
5.5. Publication formats for research works
Within the field of experimental and natural sciences, research results are typi-
cally disseminated through academic articles published in prestigious journals. Legal 
findings, however, are often published in book format, most notably in monographs, 
commentaries and collective books, handbooks and commemorative volumes or 
tribute books.
The essential qualitative shifts and the most “creative leaps” in legal science are 
likely to be left in monographs 160, whose purpose is to become reference works that 
put forward legal topics (having regard to the state of the art), further elaborate on 
them, and (at least in terms of definition or speculation) scientifically “close” these 
legal topics. No one should doubt that, from the perspective of scientific achieve-
ment, a good legal monograph is worth more than a good article. Handbooks are 
heterogeneous products: on one end, there are handbooks that qualify as original, 
innovative intellectual works acknowledged as a reference in the field 161; on the other 
158 See LIENHARD et al., 2016: 38, 163, 173, although multilingualism in Switzerland has a 
different legal framework from that of regional languages in Spain.
159 See SCHULZE-FIELITZ, 2002: 16.
160 See SCHULZE-FIELITZ, 2002: 18.
161 Let’s think of Derecho civil de España by Federico DE CASTRO (the first volume was published 
in 1943); or of Derecho constitucional. Sistema de fuentes by Ignacio DE OTTO (the first edition was re-
leased in 1987), among other salient examples. In Germany, it is almost a cliché to cite, in this context, 
the Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, by Konrad HESSE (the first edition 
dates back to 1967 and the 20th edition was released in 1995).
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end, there is room for more modest works successfully intended to become teaching 
support tools which should not be considered research works.
Within the social sub-system of Spanish legal science, it is currently hard to find 
reliable indicators to assess the quality of research pieces published in books. In order 
to reliably assess quality, each research work should be subject to peer review (in the 
sexenio assessment procedure, for instance). The publisher’s prestige or standing 162 
is not an easily applicable criterion to any product that has access thereto, mostly if 
the author who intends to publish the manuscript also offers to totally or partially fi-
nance the publication. Within the Spanish legal context, the assessments included in 
book reviews (recensiones) are not reliable 163, they rarely give rise to a critical debate 
with the author about his/her work. The contributions to commemorative volumes 
are very much in need of a specific quality assessment, as a result of standard practice 
in the drafting of these tribute works. This situation might change if increasingly 
more publishers or collections within publishing houses subject manuscripts to peer 
review prior to the editor’s final publication decision.
5.6. Law is a discipline “of mostly individual authorship”
Legal research has a long-standing tradition of individual authorship whose sur-
vival or preservation in terms of public support has only depended on being allocated 
sufficient basic resources 164. This tradition (alongside with some free-riding) explains 
why co-authorship has prompted some “suspicion” 165 from the standpoint of legal 
research assessment. Nevertheless, the system must learn to separate the wheat from 
the chaff; it should not only refrain from penalizing, but it must also encourage, 
those co-authored works “naturally resulting from genuinely multidisciplinary re-
search” 166 and helping advance scientific knowledge.
162 SALVADOR CODERCH et al., 2008: 54-55, suggest to use this criterion.
163 See Gabriel DOMÉNECH, “Malas prácticas universitarias (I): la recensión”, 2016. Available 
at: https://almacendederecho.org/malas-practicas-universitarias-i-la-recension/
164 In this vein, see SCHULZE-FIELITZ, 2002: 12; WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2012: 38; OCHS-
NER et al., 2017: 5.
165 Criterion 2 applicable to Field 9 (“Law and Case Law”) provided in the Resolution issued 
by CNEAI on November 14, 2018 disclosing the specific criteria approved for each of the fields of 
assessment (within the procedure for the granting of sexenios) is worded as follows: “The number of 
authors of a contribution should be justified on grounds of complexity and length, as well as it should 
be justified in light of the topic. The relevant applicants must state, giving reasons, their substantive 
contribution to the co-authored work”.
166 See Gabriel DOMÉNECH, “Malas prácticas universitarias (II): la interdisciplinariedad”, 2016. 
Available at: https://almacendederecho.org/malas-practicas-universitarias-ii-la-interdisciplinariedad/
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6. QUALITY CRITERIA IN LEGAL RESEARCH ASSESSMENT
Is there a closed list of universally accepted quality criteria within legal research 
assessment? When drafting an assessment report, we tend to be sure about our con-
clusion, i.e., we are positive about whether a research work is very good, just good, 
poor, or awful. However, it is hard to specifically state the criteria guiding our con-
clusion. Above all, it is not always easy that two reports by two well-respected legal 
scholars on the same work agree on the conclusion and on the supporting arguments 
and criteria.
Us legal scholars still need to reflect on what we do within a debate expressly held 
with a twofold purpose: i) to further standardize or formally establish the criteria 
applied to assess the quality of our work, and ii) to achieve a greater consensus about 
such criteria 167. If we want to be subject to proper assessment, i.e., if we want to 
be correctly evaluated, we should make this effort, since it is reasonable to believe 
that nobody will be able to do it better than us. It does not suffice to sit down and 
complain about how the quality of our research is assessed under inappropriate or 
unsuitable criteria. To a large extent, our task is to render transparent the criteria that 
are being implicitly applied 168.
Probably, legal researchers could easily agree on a few (highly abstract) criteria to 
assess the quality of legal research. These criteria would be placed on a scale ranging 
from the more substantive to the more formal: originality (which pertains to the 
very essence of research, i.e., new scientific knowledge); systematic relevance (for 
example, because a concept is created that allows to connect a lot of positive law); 
theoretical weight (although, as noted above, the ties between theory and practice 
are inherent to legal science); use of rigorous and correct arguments and lines of rea-
soning; clarity in the exposition and precise language 169, appropriate structure, use 
of relevant references and correct citations, etc. 170.
As has been stated, in general terms, and at least regarding the assessment of 
researchers under Field 9 (“Law and Legal Science”), it is safe to say that the quality 
criteria that have long been used within sexenio assessment procedures are well-de-
fined. These criteria are as follows: “originality, rigour, methodology and impact” of 
the scholarly works will be taken into account; also, those works that “bring knowl-
edge and provide conceptual and analytical instruments to render legal rules more 
effective” will be given particular consideration, as well as “case law analyses based 
on rulings settling related cases aimed at clarifying case law criteria and the evolution 
thereof”. However, “merely descriptive works or the repetition of previous contribu-
167 See SCHULZE-FIELITZ, 2002: 3.
168 In this connection, see OCHSNER et al., 2017: 6.
169 RAMÓN Y CAJAL, 1920: 136-137, suggests to follow Gracián’s advice regarding research 
works: “Thou shall speak as in wills, where the fewer the words, the fewer the quarrels”.
170 In this connection, see SCHULZE-FIELITZ, 2002: 26 et seq.; Lienhard et al., 2016: 169 et seq.
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tions will be disregarded” 171. This could be a good starting point to state the quality 
standards of our disciplines.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS
Public authorities competent for research assessment matters are responsible for 
creating organizational structures, as well as for coming up with research assessment 
procedures that should be well-suited for science. Within this statement, “well-suited 
for science” means appropriateness of research assessment for each and every scien-
tific discipline. Considering that only every individual discipline can come up with 
“the best” assessment criteria, the aforesaid organizational and procedural public re-
sponsibilities translate into the following obligation: public authorities (lawmakers 
or rulemaking bodies) must create organizations and come up with procedures al-
lowing for the various scholarly fields to set the criteria applicable to public assess-
ment of research. Public authorities should create and open up organizational and 
procedural structures within their administrative bodies so as to welcome scientific 
communities to bring knowledge that only they would have; this knowledge is much 
needed by public authorities to fulfil their duty of promoting scientific research.
Moreover, each of these scientific communities should be aware, as a group, of 
their responsibility in drawing up assessment criteria and standards well-suited for 
their research works and researchers. If the representatives of a given scholarly field 
are unable to agree on their quality standards, this scientific community will no 
longer have the right to complain (which is not uncommon) about the unsuitability 
of the criteria applied thereto 172.
This can have some implications in practice. For instance, ANECA may enter 
into agreements with professor associations from each discipline (if deemed suffi-
ciently representative) in order for each of them i) to draft a document laying down 
the criteria applicable to accreditations or sexenio assessments; ii) to prepare appro-
priate peer review forms for each assessment; or even, for these associations iii) to 
nominate their own scholars for the evaluation committees. In the absence of associ-
ations of scholars, the competent public authorities should create other appropriate 
fora to allow for the representatives of scientific disciplines to fulfil these tasks. The 
point is to enhance or refine something that, to a great extent, already exists. There 
is no doubt that the general criteria for sexenio assessments within the legal domain 
were drafted by legal scholars, and it is also obvious that the document titled “As-
sessable merits” (which drew some criticism above) was prepared by ANECA’s Law 
171 See Section 4 of the criteria for Field 9 of the Resolution issued by CNEAI on November 14, 
2018 disclosing the specific criteria approved for each of the fields of assessment. Available at: https://
www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2018-16138
172 With similar approaches, see Lienhard et al., 2016: 169; WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, 2012: 8, 48; 
and OCHSNER et al., 2017: 9, who refer to this issue regarding the setting of criteria (from each of the 
scientific communities to research assessment public bodies) as “bottom-up approach”.
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evaluation committee. We should further advance the idea that public authorities 
create procedures and organizational structures whilst scientific disciplines (aware 
of their collective responsibility) use them to get involved in assessment procedures 
contributing their know-how.
As for the assessments of researchers’ CVs (accreditations and concursos), which 
obviously do not allow the evaluation committee or the external expert to access all 
the contents of the researcher’s work, scientific communities should also be respon-
sible for preparing lists of prestigious journals and publishers in each field; these 
would serve as quality indicators for publications. If this task is not performed by 
each field of knowledge, the results are often questionable and actually challenged 173. 
These lists can also be used to calculate the number of publications to be taken into 
account in institutional assessment procedures. It would be very useful (and it would 
reduce the burden of submitting information within assessment procedures) for the 
documentation and database services of university schools to work with these lists, 
so that the number of publications in the relevant journals by the researchers from 
every school will be constantly updated.
Using both the quality criteria applicable to research works within each field 
and the indicators on prestigious journals and publishers allows to draft suitable 
forms for the abovementioned “informed” peer review processes, where experts are 
required to appropriately substantiate their assessment in a sufficiently precise man-
ner and expressly addressing the criteria pertaining to their disciplines. 
In order to lighten red tape and optimize the data minimization principle, in-
stitutional assessments require a design that allows for using little (yet meaningful) 
data obtained in other assessments, such as the sexenio assessments of university re-
searchers. It is essential to use indicators that comply with the formal equality of all 
disciplines, among others: the lists of journals drafted by each discipline, and not 
indicators that reward certain disciplines over others, or the number of agreements 
entered into under Art. 83 LOU instead of the amount of private funding obtained 
therefrom.
It is worth concluding by listing a few specific proposals regarding Spanish law 
on research assessment that touch on detailed aspects: i) the doctoral dissertation 
approval and evaluation should also allow to identify (and, where appropriate, pe-
nalize) research malpractice by the doctoral candidate; ii) not selecting only the best 
proposals, as they have been submitted, and with regard to resource availability, but 
increasing the number of funded (selected) projects by deciding, ex officio, to allocate 
less funding than requested to all or most of the selected proposals, would amount 
173 In the field of administrative law, for example, in spite of the methodological rigour, one could 
question the ranking of legal journals prepared by the Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology 
(Fundación Española para la Ciencia y Tecnología, FECYT) published in 2019. This ranking inclu-
des neither Indret, nor the Revista Española de Derecho Administrativo, maybe because the assessment 
procedure is optional or voluntary. The ranking is available at: file:///C:/Users/Usuario/Downloads/
ranking_revistas.pdf
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to a misallocation of resources; iii) main researchers within research projects should 
be informed of the negative assessments on an ex post basis; otherwise, no negative 
(and unknown) consequences from these negative evaluations can be inferred for 
future calls or applications; iv) within sexenio assessments, in case of negative evalua-
tions, the parties concerned must be granted a hearing; also, the granting of a sexenio 
cannot be denied if a researcher from the same field as the applicant has not been 
involved in the procedure, either as a member of the committee or as an external 
expert; v) ANECA’s soft law provisions applicable to accreditations for tenured po-
sitions (associate professorships and full professorships) should be re-elaborated in 
order for them to appropriately assess quality (and not quantity) as expressly required 
by RD 415/2015; vi) the procedure regarding the so-called “promotion positions” 
(plazas de promoción or “positions to be upgraded”) must be rethought and rede-
signed altogether. Perhaps, the underlying problem of this procedure can only be 
solved by the enactment of a statutory provision or Act of Parliament.
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